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In the first essay of this dissertation, I study the impact that hedge fund manager connections have on 
investment ideas. I find that hedge fund managers who previously worked at the same prior hedge fund 
invest more similarly, hold more overlapping portfolios, and trade and overweight the same stocks 
relative to managers who do not share an employment connection. Overall, these results support 
theoretical prediction that networked managers share ideas that leads to price discovery for commonly 
held stocks. 
The second essay analyzes the role of ETFs in mutual fund families and is joint work with Caitlin 
Dannhauser. We study mutual fund and ETF twins - index funds from the same family that follow the 
same benchmark. We find that mutual fund twins have lower overall tax burdens while ETF twins have 
higher long-term yields and unrealized capital gains, but are compensated with lower expense ratios. 
Fund families benefit because twin offerings generate higher flows than their non-twin peers. These 
results support previous research that mutual fund families use diversification and subsidization to 
benefit the overall family. 
In the third essay, I study the use of latent factors in explaining hedge fund returns. Using an 
alternative latent factor estimator, asymptotic principal components (APC), I find explains more of the 
common variation of hedge fund returns on average and does so with greater efficiency than that found 
in the literature. I also identify an increase in the common variation across hedge fund excess return in 
the time-series via the extracted latent factors. My results suggest an impetus for future researchers to 
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Abstract
Social connections are an important determinant for investment decisions. Using a pro-
prietary dataset of hedge fund manager employment backgrounds, I find that hedge fund
managers who previously worked at the same hedge fund invest more similarly and hold over-
lapping portfolios up to 49% more than managers who do not share an employment connection.
Furthermore, related managers contemporaneously herd more and over-weight the same stocks
versus unconnected managers, providing evidence for the social exchange of investment ideas
within a network. A long/short portfolio of overlapped-connected/unique-unconnected stocks
generates alpha of 4.5% per year and permanently conveys private information to asset prices.
These findings support the “quid-pro-quo” model of Stein (2008) and confirms that shared
employment histories signal increased ex-ante correlations between connected portfolios.
⇤Special thanks to my dissertation committee (Pierluigi Balduzzi, Alan Marcus, Je↵rey Ponti↵, Jonathan Reuter,
and Ronnie Sadka (chair)) for their assistance on this article–the first essay in my doctoral dissertation. I am also
grateful to Caitlin Dannhauser, Slava Fos, Matthew Osborn, Christopher Schwarz (discussant), Phil Strahan, and
Jerome Taillard for useful comments. Thanks also to participants at the 2015 Ph.D. Conference in Finance at the
University of Southern California, and at seminars at Boston College, Florida International University, Texas Tech
University, the University of Hawai‘i at Ma¯noa, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Department of
Economic and Risk Analysis. Spilker is from the Carroll School of Management, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth
Avenue, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467; Contact: tray.spilker@bc.edu or www2.bc.edu/tray-spilker.
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“It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary,
their social being that determines their consciousness.”
– Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859)
Introduction
Given the human condition is an inherently social one, as Marx points out, individuality is di cult
to divorce from the social fabric from which it is collectively shaped. This sentiment is found in
the English literature as early as the 17th century, when John Donne penned that “No man is an
island entire of itself.”1 In more recent history, the popular press has noted the primacy of social
networks over individual intelligence, coining the common saying – “It’s not what you know; it’s
who you know.”2 Given the recent rise of social networking platforms, the market has ensconced
social valuation in asset prices today. The combined market capitalizations of the three largest
social networking platforms Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat total $426 billion, or 2.6% of U.S.
GDP, as of this writing.3
The financial literature identifies the economic consequence of social networks as well. Hong,
Kubik, and Stein (2005) are among the first to establish word-of-mouth e↵ects among mutual fund
managers. The authors find that managers working in the same city buy more of the same stocks
when their co-located peers do so. Pool, Sto↵man, and Yonker (2015) find that mutual fund man-
agers who live in the same neighborhood invest in the same stock more often than managers who are
not neighbors. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) find more highly networked venture capitalists
outperform lesser-networked competitors by virtue of their superior ability to exit investments prof-
itably. Furthermore, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) show that mutual fund managers generate
outsized returns when trading connected stocks, where the connection is between the manager and
a corporate board member who attended the same university.
In this study, I explore whether connected hedge fund managers – those who used to work
for the same prior hedge fund – invest more similarly relative to managers who worked at di↵ering
1Meditation 17, John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions XVII,1623
222 September, 1918, New York (NY) Tribune, “U. S. to Act to Oust Ship Work Slackers,” pg. 9, col. 1
3LinkedIn was included in the original version of this paper. The final valuation of LinkedIn was roughly $26
billion prior to its acquisition by Microsoft in December 2016. See: https://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-closes-
acquisition-of-linkedin-1481215151
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hedge funds; i.e., unconnected managers. I bring to the literature a proprietary dataset of over
500 hedge fund manager employment histories. These hedge fund managers hail from the largest
networks of hedge fund managers in the industry, thus providing many testable connections for
statistical inference. I obtain quarterly portfolio holdings for each hedge fund using form 13F that
is made available by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Unfortunately, 13F
covered securities include only long positions in public equities. Hence, the analysis is confined to
the long side of a hedge fund’s portfolio; a common constraint in the hedge fund literature using
13F data.
In my first test, I use the pair-wise fund-level portfolio overlap measure of Pool et al. (2015)
to measure quarterly portfolio overlap between each pair of hedge fund managers in my sample. I
find portfolio overlap is 29.7% higher among connected hedge fund managers who share a common
employment history. Since my identification relies on 13F disclosures, it follows that estimating
portfolio overlap between managers pursuing strategies that are not well identified through long
equity positions merely adds noise. Hence, when I constrain the test only to long/short equity
hedge funds, portfolio overlap increases to 48.5% among connected managers. This baseline result
shows that network connections are an important determinant for hedge fund manager investment
decisions.
In addition to the social network channel, overlapping portfolios can also obtain from similar
preference sets obtained from working for the same prior hedge fund manager. The manager origin
literature identifies a learning channel that leads to manager fixed-e↵ects. Bertrand and Schoar
(2003) find corporate managers gain valuable portable skills from former workplaces that can be
traced to the manager as they impact corporate actions in subsequent executive roles. Papageorgiou,
Parwada, and Tan (2011) show that hedge fund managers with prior experience at hedge funds
outperform those managers with training at other types of firms. Subsequently, hedge fund managers
of the same background are likely to have learned to follow similar investment approaches.
In e↵ort to disentangle the channels that lead to overlapping portfolios, I construct treat-
ment and control groups to conduct stock-level tests in a di↵erences-in-di↵erences framework. The
treatment group is formed by those managers who previously worked for one of the largest and
most influential hedge funds in the industry’s history; Tiger Management. Hedge fund managers
belonging to this treatment group are known colloquially as “Tiger Cubs” and represent a sizeable
fraction of the industry with over $250 billion in combined assets; roughly 13% of total industry
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assets in 2011 (Mallaby (2011)). I find the treatment group of managers concentrates more portfolio
risk in fewer positions on average, and more actively trade their respective portfolios relative to the
remaining sample of hedge funds.
These two investment decisions – portfolio construction and turnover – are shown to be im-
portant determinants of performance in the literature. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) find
that managers who hold concentrated portfolios in industries where they possess informational ad-
vantages outperform more diversified portfolios. Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (Forthcoming)
show that hedge fund managers trade more in the presence of alpha producing trades, thus higher
turnover generates superior excess returns. Hence, I posit that portfolio construction and turnover
decisions are an important determinant in fund performance that arise from adopting techniques of
a formative mentor and is shared across a network of connected hedge fund managers.
I create a control group by matching the treatment group on these learned characteristics
that are observable in form 13F; average number of quarterly holdings, average position weighting,
and turnover. In my first stock-level analysis, I find that connected managers conditionally herd
more into stocks (Wermers (1999)), and over-weight these overlapped stocks by 12.4% relative to
unconnected hedge funds. This finding is incremental to the 13% gain due to the word-of-mouth
e↵ect found by Hong et al. (2005), as I also match on the city where funds are headquartered.
Presumably, connected managers who share valuable investment ideas do so with an expecta-
tion of receiving credible investment leads from their network in the future. Stein (2008) models this
“quid pro quo” behavior among fund managers, whom are in direct competition for fund flows, as
an incentive-compatible equilibrium where the cost of lying in the model is high for the agent who
does so, and where bad ideas never propagate beyond the incipient discussion stage. Supporting
this, I find overlapped positions drive risk-adjusted return di↵erences between the treatment and
control groups. The treatment group derives 25% more of its alpha from commonly held positions
in the network relative to the control group.
Importantly, this confirms information transfer to security prices, which Pool et al. (2015) also
find among shared positions of mutual fund managers who are neighbors. The authors argue the
impact on security prices is not merely endogeneity resulting from shared preference sets leading
to similar trading conclusions as modeled by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992), but rather is
indicative of valuable information transmitting through a network of neighboring fund managers.
My findings support a similar hypothesis that a social network among hedge fund managers who
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share a common employment history is active and conveying information to security prices. It is
hard to imagine a scenario where overlapped positions persist over the sample as a result of shared
fixed-e↵ects, particularly in the presence of contemporaneous herding and over-weighting behavior.
I buttress the network channel conclusion with results on cumulative average abnormal returns
as used in Coval and Sta↵ord (2007). I show that abnormal returns to stocks held by connected
funds are higher than those held by unconnected funds. More importantly, this di↵erence of 15%
is statistically significant and is not mean reverting, indicating that information transmitted via
connected managers carries private information to asset prices. If the shock were transitory, the
alternative hypothesis of no information – where the network is merely exerting price pressure akin
to a “pump and dump” strategy – would be more likely.
A counterfactual where lesser informed funds within the network follow the holdings data of
fellow funds they deem better informed is possible (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)).
And hedge fund managers may also follow certain connected members’ investing decisions inten-
tionally to ensure they su↵er no reputational degradation that may result from under-performing
funds in the same network (Scharfstein and Stein (1990)). However, my results on herding behavior
(Wermers (1999)), show that the treatment group conditionally herds more into and out of stocks
relative to the control group. Thus, mimicking behavior within a network is likely a second order
e↵ect, giving primacy to the network channel.
In a contemporaneous paper, Gerritzen, Jackwerth, and Plazzi (2016) use a similar identifica-
tion of prior employment histories to show that connected hedge fund managers have more similar
risk exposures relative to unconnected managers. Thus, our findings are mutually supportive. My
study reaches further, however, to identify how similar risk exposures manifest across connected
managers. As such, I identify that the channel for performance similarities arises not only from
shared investment behaviors via a learning channel,4 but also through shared investment positions
conveyed through a lively social network, which I attempt to disentangle. Furthermore, I show these
connections have an impact on the cross-section of hedge fund returns, drive abnormal performance
within a connected network of funds, and convey information to asset prices.
Lastly, my results contribute to the fund family literature. Brown, Fraser, and Liang (2008)
note that the cost of initial due diligence on a prospective hedge fund manager exceeds $1 million and
4In this study, I use the term ‘learning channel’ to describe the acquisition mechanism that leads to manager
fixed-e↵ects found in Bertrand and Schoar (2003).
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400 man hours. Further, Anson (2006) recommends spending 75 - 100 hours reviewing a hedge fund
manager before investing. Thus, leveraging fund family structures is one avenue to reduce search
related expenses. But, unlike mutual funds, managers who depart a brand name hedge fund often
establish independent funds with no formal ties to their former employer. Several factors are likely
to contribute to this di↵erence. First, the “2+20” incentive structure of the hedge fund industry
leads many portfolio managers within reputable hedge fund firms to strike out independently to
capitalize on the cache of their training. Second, relative to the administrative and financial burden
that would accompany a similar mutual fund launch, these managers face a lower regulatory burden
when establishing a hedge fund management company. Therefore, mutual fund starts typically occur
within families as a larger fund family can more easily handle this burden.
Unfortunately, investors who rely on family a liation to source new funds face an inher-
ent problem among independent hedge fund managers (Massa (2003), Gervais, Lynch, and Musto
(2005)), as search becomes more costly when fund family a liation is not readily apparent (Sirri
and Tufano (1998)). However, when marketing their funds, hedge fund managers necessarily dis-
close their roles at prior employers as part of the due diligence process; with an expectation that
their a liation will o↵er a signal about their skill. Hence, by identifying connections between hedge
fund managers, an informal fund family structure materializes, thereby providing a credible signal
to reduce search costs. Additionally, given my results on connected managers, investors can use
this “family” signal to more e ciently diversify portfolios of hedge funds by identifying hedge funds
managers ex-ante whose performance is likely to be highly correlated (Elton, Gruber, and Green
(2007)).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses construction of the dataset and identifies
the treatment group. Section 2 describes the methodological setting, including the matching process
used to build the control group. Section 3 presents evidence that connected hedge funds have
a higher percentage of overlapping portfolios. I attempt to dissentangle the channels that lead
to overlapped portfolios in Section 4, by analyzing conditional herding tendencies and allocation
decisions to commonly held positions. Section 5 provides evidence that these common positions drive
abnormal returns, suggesting that information flows through a connected network and impacts asset
prices, which I confirm later in the section with asset pricing implications. I conclude in Section 6.
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1 Data and Sample Construction
I utilize a novel proprietary dataset of just over 500 hedge fund manager employment histories
gleaned from the largest institutional investors and investment advisors in the U.S. As such, this
selection of funds may produce di↵erentiated returns and have more onerous lockup provisions
relative to an unbiased sample, as these hedge funds are considered “best of breed” in the industry.5
This list is cross-checked with internet searches and news wires to validate data quality. Reference
sights include LinkedIn, Bloomberg, Insider Monkey, HF Alert, and MarketFolley, among others.
To this dataset, I hand match hedge funds to regulatory filings administered by the SEC, firstly
by matching the name of the fund, then by the first filing date which corresponds most closely to
the fund’s inception date. From this, I obtain quarterly hedge fund portfolio holdings as reported in
form 13F and made available in the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings Database (s34 master
file).6 Notably, 13F filings only identify long positions held in a given quarter-end portfolio, which
truncates observations on the short side of a hedge fund’s portfolio. Thus, my analysis is restricted
to observed holdings within the long portfolios of my sample of hedge funds.
As identified in Aragon and Martin (2012), 13F filings contain information at the advisor level
such that for larger asset management firms, holdings based data may incorporate multiple funds
in the fund family, which may include portfolios other than hedge funds. Thus, I screen my sample
to those funds whose line of business consists solely of hedge fund strategies (e.g., I exclude the likes
of Merrill Lynch, GAMCO, etc.). Further, since I am using 13F holdings information to identify
holding patterns across hedge fund networks, I restrict my sample to long/short hedge funds as this
strategy is best identified by the information contained in 13F forms, resulting in 296 hedge funds
in the base sample.
Thomson Reuters uses two date fields. RDATE (reporting date) represents the end of quarter
date for which holdings information is valid, and FDATE, which is a vintage field created by
5Aragon (2007) shows that funds with lockup restrictions earn excess returns of 4-7% relative to funds without
lockup clauses.
6Enacted in 1975, Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires institutional investment managers
who manage over $100 million to file 13F forms within 45 days after the end of each quarter. These filings contain
information on the fund’s investment holdings at the end of the respective quarter that are defined as 13F securities.
These include public equities, closed-end funds, exchange traded funds (ETFs), certain equity options and warrants,
as well as certain convertible bonds.
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Thomson Reuters to ensure continuity of holdings information when a fund is late in reporting
to the SEC (i.e., RDATE is carried forward). Thomson Reuters notes that a “slight majority” of
RDATEs coincide with the same FDATE for mutual funds found in the s12 master file, but that
RDATE and FDATE are the same in a “large majority” of investment companies in the s34 master
file. None the less, I follow standard practice and use only observations where RDATE is equal to
FDATE to restrict stale data from my sample.7
Among the sample, one hedge fund employer stands out for generating the largest number of
independent long/short hedge funds; Tiger Management. From its launch in 1980 to its e↵ective
closure in 2000,8 Julian Robertson’s Tiger Management generated annualized returns of roughly
19% and grew to $22 billion in assets, which was second only to George Soros’ Quantum fund at
the time. Over its history, Tiger Management spun out myriad portfolio managers who subsequently
established their own competing hedge funds. In sum, I’ve identified some 69 “Tiger Cubs,” who
themselves sired 30 “Grand Cubs” and 4 “Great Grand Cubs,” the sum of which oversee more than
$250 billion in assets, or roughly 13% in total hedge fund assets in 2011(Mallaby (2011)). Due to
the size of the connected funds in this network, I use them as the treatment group in my study.
Unfortunately, only 55 members of the treatment family have a history of 13F filings, which is
further reduced to 46 after limiting the analysis to long/short hedge funds with a U.S. geographic
focus. Lastly, I include only those funds with at least eight quarters worth of holdings of data
resulting in a treatment group of 42 funds. The 13F filing requirement pertains to covered securities
in the U.S., therefore hedge funds who invest mainly outside the U.S. will not be well identified
by 13F holdings. Separating my treatment group from the remaining sample, and filtering the
remaining sample by the above criterion results in 232 funds from which to select a control group.
In sum, the data for this study covers quarterly observations from January, 2000 to December, 2013,
containing 156,494 stock-quarter observations across 274 distinct hedge funds.
7See the Thomson Reuters User Guide found on the Wharton Research Data Service website: https://wrds-
web.wharton.upenn.edu
8Julian Robertson closed the fund to outside capital and returned funds to investors after substantial losses. Tiger
Management remains a family o ce known for its hedge fund seeding program.
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2 Methodology
Allocation decisions in active fund management explain a large proportion of resultant performance
(Markowitz (1959) and Sharpe (1970)). These decisions are typically embedded in portfolio con-
struction and risk management techniques that govern what proportion of assets a manager allocates
to an investment idea, an industry, net- and gross-market exposures, and hedging strategies, among
others. Portfolio construction, specifically, dictates how much investment risk is concentrated in
any single investment, across any groupings of positions (e.g., the total weightings of the largest
ten investments, or to any single industry), how many total investments are held in the portfolio in
a given cross-section, and upper bounds on weightings for the highest conviction investments. The
discipline of portfolio construction balances the manager’s desire to generate excess returns from
over-weighting her best investment ideas, against putting the firm’s survival at risk if the investment
thesis fails.
To the extent that correlated portfolio construction behavior among connected hedge funds
manifests, a logical channel to explain this phenomena may be shared influence from a formative
mentor. Influence from other channels is unlikely to drive such a critical investment management
decision, particularly as the heterogeneity of management styles does not predict which portfolio
characteristics may follow. Hence, I argue that similarities in portfolio construction characterize a
learned skill shared across connected managers, and thus I construct my control group by matching
on these characteristics.
[Table 1 here]
Table 1 presents summary portfolio characteristics for the treatment group and the remaining
unmatched sample. A discernible di↵erence quickly emerges between the treatment and unmatched
sample. The treatment family holds decidedly fewer positions during an average quarter, 39 versus
the sample’s 95. Further, the average number of positions is remarkably consistent among funds in
the treatment group as shown by the standard deviation of 23 positions, which stands in contrast to
the distribution of average number of holdings for the unmatched sample of 165 positions. Figure
1 shows the distribution of quarterly holdings for both the treatment and unmatched sample. The
treatment group clearly holds fewer positions on average, resulting in more concentrated portfolios
and larger allocations to each holding on average. The di↵erence in weights assigned to the average
position between the two groups is stark; the treatment group allocates 2.5 times more to an average
9
position relative to the treatment group, 2.58% vs. 1.05%.9
[Figure 1 here]
Interestingly, the average holding size of investments in their predecessor’s portfolio, Tiger
Management, is smaller. Thus, it would be hard to conclude these funds transported a learned
skill. Julian Robertson ran a much more diversified portfolio with average position size of around
1% of assets.10 Yet, the summary statistics on the long/short treatment group indicate that these
connected managers share a proclivity to run concentrated equity portfolios on the long side. This
concentration of risk, combined with the fact that connected funds show a more narrow dispersion
in average position size, suggests treatment funds employ similar investment techniques which likely
originate from the learning channel.
2.1 Control Group Construction
Following my baseline specification, the remainder of tests in this paper rely on comparing position
weights between the treatment group and a yet to be established control group. I thus attempt
to control for the learning channel mechanism in e↵ort to tease out ongoing social connections by
identifying a matched control group based on similar portfolio construction. I perform a two nearest-
neighbor match (without replacement) firstly on fund start date, then on fund longevity, average
number of quarterly holdings, average position weighting, average turnover, and headquarter loca-
tion. In this setting, a fund’s start date is the first date for which a 13F report exists. Matching on
this measure ensures both the treatment and control groups encountered similar market conditions
at the incipient stage of their respective life cycles. Fund longevity is measured as the di↵erence
from the first 13F filing date to the last, and is used to ensure that I have a similar number of funds
in the matched control group through the time-series. Since the unit of analysis relies on position
level detail and portfolio construction behavior to define characteristics of hedge fund networks, I
match on the average number of securities and average position weighting calculated from a fund’s
respective quarterly 13F filing history. Lastly, matching on location adjusts for the Hong et al.
(2005) finding that fund managers in the same city exhibit word-of-mouth e↵ects by trading the
same stocks in a given quarter when their co-located peers do so.
9Here, I define position weighting as fund j’s dollar allocation to stock i at the end of quarter t, divided by the
sum of all dollar allocations by fund j for that quarter.
10Thanks to Christopher Schwarz (discussant) for identifying this contradiction
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The final panel of Table 1 contains summary information for the matched control group.
As shown, the average number of 39 quarterly holdings is the same across the two groups, which
results in average position weights of 2.6%. Matching on average life results in fund longevity of
32 quarters for each group. Notably, a wedge appears between the long assets invested between
treatment and control groups; $1.56 billion versus $778 million. While it is a common identification
strategy to include portfolio size ( or assets under management, AUM) as a matching criterion
for control group construction, I assert that deviations in AUM between connected managers is
not a learned trait from the perspective of a manager fixed-e↵ect. Just as portfolio management
techniques is to alpha production, asset raising strategies are not guaranteed to result in flows. And
since AUM is an outcome variable where the input is latent (ie., the manager’s marketing strategy),
it would not be appropriate to use as a matching variable in this setting.11 Furthermore, larger
asset flows enjoyed by connected managers in the treatment group likely arise from the variation
that we are attempting to measure. For example, it’s possible that as a result of their known
pedigree–and hence, network connections–higher flows follow. This is an important characteristic
because as assets accrue to the average hedge fund, typically the manager is compelled to reduce
portfolio concentration and increase the average number of securities held in the portfolio. This
suggests that connected managers in the treatment group might be more able to hew to their initial
investment strategies of running more concentrated portfolios.
3 Network Connections and Portfolio Overlap
Do connected hedge funds invest in a more coordinated fashion on average? Further still, do they
invest with more conviction when fund managers of the same ancestry invest similarly? A positive
response to either would indicate a tie between connected funds, but a positive finding for the latter
would suggest that connected funds share investment ideas through an active network.
In this section, I explore the first question in my baseline test; whether connected managers
co-invest more often relative to unconnected managers. I use the PortOverlap measure o↵ered by
Pool et al. (2015) in my main analysis, with the notation adjusted slightly. The authors measure
11Matching on portfolio size reduces the close fit between the treatment and control group in terms of obervable
control variables stemming from portfolio construction strategies.
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where wi,j,t is fund j’s portfolio weight in stock i during quarter t, wi,k,t is the same for fund k, and
Ht is the set of all stocks held by funds j and k as reported at the end of quarter t. For example,
if during quarter t fund j has 5% allocated to stock i, and fund k has 10% allocated to the same
stock i, then PortOverlap is equal to 5% for this fund-pair during quarter t. Using this measure as
my dependent variable, I estimate the following specification,
PortOverlapj,k,t = ↵ +  SameNetworkj,k,t +  SameCityj,k,t +  
0Controlsj,k,t + "j,k,t, (2)
where, SameNetworkj,k,t is a dummy variable equal to one if fund j and fund k belong to the
same hedge fund network, SameCityj,k,t is a dummy variable that is one if fund j and fund k
are headquartered in the same city, and Controlsj,k,t is a vector of control variables. As controls,
I include (a) a set of dummy variables that are equal to one if funds j and k pursue the same
hedge fund strategy (Activist, Equity Long/Short, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven, Macro,
and Multi-Strategy); (b) the AUM-based quintiles of funds j and k (AUMQuintAvg); and (c) the
absolute value in the di↵erences between AUM-based quintiles of funds j and k (AUMQuintDi↵ ).12
Table 2 shows estimates and standard errors for various forms of the regression detailed in
equation 3. Given the model is performed in a pairwise fashion, the same fund is present across
myriad pairings, giving rise to a lack of independence across observations. Hence, standard errors
are two-way clustered for each fund in the fund-pair.13. I provide results for this specification in
two panels. The first includes results across all strategies, and the second reports estimates for only
equity long/short funds.
In the first test (Column 1), I estimate whether the finding of Hong et al. (2005)–where
managers exposed to the same media market by operating in the same city–holds among hedge
fund managers. Interestingly, I find that it does not hold in this setting; hedge fund managers
in my sample operating in the same city exhibit no di↵erential propensity to hold overlapping
portfolios. In the second test, I explore whether a manager’s network connections influences their
investment decisions. If so, then the loading on   will be positive,which I find. The significant
12Assets under management (AUM) in this setting are the sum of all long positions disclosed in each fund’s
quarterly 13F filing.
13This follows from Pool et al. (2015)
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coe cient for SameNetwork of 1.75% implies that on average, connected managers have a 31.6%
higher rate of overlapping portfolios than unconnected managers; moving from the average minimum
portfolio overlap of 5.54% across all funds to 7.29% (= 1.75% + 5.54%). Strategy controls are
included in Column 2 to ensure we account for investment strategies that may endogenously lead
to overlapping investments. For example, hedge fund managers pursuing merger arbitrage (which
is included under the event-driven strategy) will likely invest similarly in reaction to acquisition
announcements regardless of common skill sets nor network a liation. The same can be said of
convertible arbitrage strategies (also covered by event-driven strategies) that are typically dependent
on new security supply from corporate issuances.
[Table 2 here]
Following the example of Pool et al. (2015), I calculate AUMQuintAvg as the average of fund
size quintiles across funds j and k, which controls for the presumption that increases in fund-pair
sizes results in a higher probability that an overlap can occur. Yet, this average size control cannot
account for subtle di↵erences between the fund-pair sizes. Consider for example two fund-pairs
where in the first, funds j and k are of size quintile 5 and 1, respectively, resulting in an average size
quintile of 3. Meanwhile in the second pairing, funds j and k are both in size quintile 3, resulting in
the same average size quintile of 3. Comparing the average size quintiles in this example juxtaposes
two fund-pairs with the same AUMQuintAvg, making it hard to determine whether a positive
relationship in average AUM size among fund-pairs matters for portfolio overlaps, or whether the
distance between AUM size for funds j and k is important. Hence, AUMQuintDi↵ accounts for
this distance. A negative estimate for   would indicate that as the di↵erence in assets between
funds j and k increases their portfolio overlap would decrease, which is exactly what I find. The
estimate for AUMQuintAvg and AUMQuintDi↵ is 187 bps and -74 bps, respectively. Therefore, on
average portfolio overlap increases by 113 bps ( 32.5% increase) after controlling for size. Notably,
size controls explain almost half of the average portfolio overlap, with the constant coe cient, ↵
decreasing by 37.2% to 3.48% in the final specification.
In the final specification, I include controls to account for variation in size across and between
fund-pairs. In contrast to Pool et al. (2015) who find a higher overlap among fund-pairs following
the same strategy, I find negative or insignificant loadings for all strategy controls. This finding
suggests that hedge fund managers do indeed have more diversified portfolios within their respective
strategies and relative to mutual funds. However, making cross-sectional inferences for strategies
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that are not well identified by 13F holdings information is problematic. For example, holdings data
for the fixed income strategy is not likely to be informative as a majority of portfolio investments
within this strategy are not covered securities required to be disclosed in 13F filings. Hence, 13F
studies in the hedge fund industry are best suited to explain the long book of equity oriented
strategies such as equity long/short.
Including all controls (Column 3), I find that portfolio overlap is 29.7% among hedge fund
managers whom are connected through the same prior employer. The coe cient for SameNetwork
1.37% is incremental to the average fund-pair overlap of 4.61% (= 3.48% + 1.87% - 0.74%) whom do
not share this connection, and after adding our control variables. Results for equity long/short funds
is displayed in the second panel of Table 2. Here, I show that these funds have a SameNetwork
estimate of 1.82%, which implies that portfolio overlap among connected long/short managers
increases to 48.5%; from 3.75% (= 2.94% + 1.34% - 0.53%) to 5.57%. This magnitude is surprising
as it implies that almost half of a connected manager’s portfolio is common to portfolios within the
network.
4 Social Influence on Holdings
In this section, I begin disentangling whether overlapping portfolios result from using an investment
strategy learned from a common prior employer, or from idea sharing through connected networks.
Whereas in the baseline specification I found that connected hedge fund manager hold overlapping
portfolios more on average, here, I analyze contemporaneous stock-level activity among connected
funds using the di↵erence-in-di↵erence framework. By controlling for manager fixed-e↵ects such as
portfolio construction and trading techniques that are likely learned from a formative mentor, I can
highlight idea sharing that results from network e↵ects.
4.1 Herding
The literature on herding tests whether excess trading, deemed “herding,” occurs in a particular
stock-quarter relative to expected trading activity when no herding occurs. If connected funds have
more overlapped portfolios on average relative to the control group, then presumably co-investments
accumulate through contemporaneous trading activity. To test whether the funds in my sample
herd, I calculate herding measures for the full hedge fund sample, as well as for the treatment
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and control subgroups using the specification set forth in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992).
Specifically, the herding measure, HM , as expressed in Wermers (1999) is,
HMi,t = |pi,t   E[pi,t]|  E |pi,t   E[pi,t]| , (3)
where, pi,t is the proportion of funds buying stock i in quarter t scaled by all funds trading during
the quarter. E[pi,t] is the expected proportion of purchases during the quarter, and is proxied
by the proportion of all trades that are purchases over a given quarter. Similarly, the second
term, E |pi,t   E[pi,t]|, serves as an adjustment factor to allow for random variation around the
proportion of buyers when, in expectation, no herding arises in the full sample. The adjustment
factor is calculated with respect to its subgroup (treatment or control groups), and I obtain the
mean herding measure, HM , by averaging across the subgroup of hedge fund managers.
Overall, I find no herding among hedge fund managers in my sample (Table 3). As pointed
out in Lakonishok et al. (1999), this should not necessarily be surprising due to the market’s need
for each buyer to have a seller for clearing. The lack of average herding also holds for the treatment
and control subgroups. However, in order to determine whether ideas are transmitted via a lively
social network, the di↵erence-in-di↵erence comparison of conditional herding between treatment
and control groups is of more interest. That is, we want to compare di↵erences in the buy-herd
measure, BHM , and the the sell-herd measure, SHM . Specifically, BHM is the average of the
herding measure, HM , conditional on pit > E[pit], and conversely, SHM is the conditional average
of HM when pit < E[pit]. These two measures identify the tendency of funds to herd while entering
a trade (buys) or while exiting a trade (sells). Additionally, I also test whether a stronger herd
obtains, calculating HM over instances in which successively more funds trade the stock-quarter
(as suggested by Wermers (1999)).
[Table 3 here]
As summarized in Panel D of Table 3, the treatment group conditionally herds more than
the control group of funds when entering and exiting a trade. For example, when three or more
funds enter (exit) a position, connected managers herd more than unconnected managers by 0.55%
(3.91%). Furthermore, the di↵erences in conditional herding between the two groups increases as
the number of funds herding into or out of the same stock-quarter increases. This is particularly
true for funds entering a position, where the di↵erence in conditional means for BHM increases
monotonically as the number of funds who buy-herd during the stock-quarter increases from 3 to 20
funds. This indicates that on average, conditional herding is more pronounced among the treatment
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group where connected members not only engage in more common trades, but do so in relatively
larger herds.
4.2 Di↵erential Allocation to Overlapped Stocks
To further disentangle whether overlapping portfolios result from using an investment strategy
learned from a shared employer or from sharing investment ideas through the connected network, I
test the hypothesis that over-weighting commonly held positions does not happen randomly. That
is, if fund managers in a connected network consistently herd into and over-weight commonly held
positions, they likely do so in response to di↵erential information. I posit these common investment
ideas are transmitted through a connected network, which not only inform the manager’s decision
about which investment to make, but by how much additional capital to allocation to the position.
To test this hypothesis, I construct a measure for adjusted relative weighting, AdjustedWeight,
to identify the sensitivity to position allocations between the treatment and control groups. Specif-












where the first term represents fund j’s weighting to stock i in quarter t, and the second term
adjusts this raw position weight by the market capitalization of stock i relative to the sum of market
capitalizations of all stocks held in fund j at the end of each quarter t. I impose this adjustment to
account for the increased likelihood that subgroups of funds will likely experience more stock-quarter
overlaps among large capitalization stocks (as noted in Wermers (1999)). Notably, this measure
moves the analysis from the fund-level, as measured in my baseline test, to the stock-level. I do
this in e↵ort to obtain more granularity in the investment decision between connected managers,
and as a robustness test to the asset-weighted portfolio overlap results in the main specification.
To measure stock level weighting sensitivity between the treatment and control groups, I
estimate the following fixed-e↵ects model:
AdjustedWeighti,j,t = ↵ +  Overlapi,j,t +  Treatmentj
+  (Overlapi,j,t ⇤ Treatmentj) + ⌧t + "i,j,t.
(5)
Here, Overlap is dummy variable equal to one for quarters in which two or more funds of the
respective subgroups hold the same stock-quarter. A positive   on Overlap indicates that hedge
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funds over-weight stock i during quarter t when other funds also hold the same stock. Treatment
is a dummy variable equal to one for connected funds in the treatment network and is zero for all
funds in the control group. Given that I constructed the control group by matching on the average
number of quarterly positions (among other controls), we should expect to see no significance on
this coe cient. Lastly, I include the interaction e↵ect of being a member of the treatment group
and holding a common stock-quarter, Overlap*Treatment. A significant coe cient for this regressor,
 , would indicate that members of the same network over-weight positions conditional on whether
other connected members also hold the position, thereby suggesting an active social network among
connected fund managers.
Findings for this test are shown in Table 4, where the last two columns highlights results ad-
justed for common cross-sectional shocks using quarter fixed e↵ects. Focusing on the fully adjusted
model in column 4, I find that conditional on holding the same stock, fund managers allocate 66 bps
more to the position, a 29.5% increase over the average adjusted weight of 2.24% indicated by the
constant term. This suggests that fund managers increase allocations to commonly held positions,
but cannot explain why they act in tandem. For example, its possible that managers find comfort
in numbers and over-weight a commonly held position because other funds also hold the stock. It’s
also possible that fund managers pursuing the same investment style reach independent conclusions
that result in over-weightings on the same stocks. As expected, the coe cient for the treatment
dummy is not di↵erentiable from zero. This result also indicates that the position adjustment factor
(right hand term of equation 2) is similar between the two groups, suggesting both groups allocate
similar proportions across relative market capitalizations.
[Table 4 here]
The interaction coe cient,  , of the treatment and overlap dummy variables can help control
for common investment models within the same investment style (equity long/short in this case).
The positive coe cient on   indicates that conditional on a stock-quarter overlap, connected fund
managers allocate 36 bps more to the position, which is a 12.4% increase in position weight relative
to funds who do not share a similar connection. Having already constructed the control group by
also matching on location, this represents an incremental response to peer allocations among hedge
fund managers who work in the same media market (Hong et al. (2005)).
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5 Asset Pricing Impact from Manager Networks
5.1 Risk-Adjusted Portfolio Returns
Thus far, I have shown that funds of a common ancestry have more correlated holding risk relative
to those funds that do not share a history. So, why do connected funds co-invest at higher rates?
Presumably, they do so in expectation that larger payo↵s will follow. As discussed in the “quid-pro-
quo” model of Stein (2008), the author theorizes that investment ideas will be exchanged among
socially connected fund managers–whom are in direct competition for flows–under the expectation
that investment ideas will be reciprocated in the future. Furthermore, the author posits that only
good investment ideas will make it past the incipient discussion phase, given that socially connected
managers will push back on poor investment ideas received from a trusted peer.
To examine whether performance is di↵erentiatied for overlapped stock-quarter pairs, I com-
pare risk-adjusted returns for the treatment and control groups using a di↵erence-in-di↵erence
framework. As I do not have access to fund returns in my sample, I proxy for monthly returns
using the long only holdings reported in 13F filings. Returns are constructed from aggregating
weighted returns to all stocks held by fund j at the end of quarter t, multiplied by returns to stock
i over the ensuing three months, k = 1, 2, 3; Rj,t+k =
PN
i=1wi,j,tri,t+k. From this constructed time-
series of returns, I subtract the risk-free rate and use these excess returns as the dependent variable.
Since I construct fund returns from long-only positions, I select my factors from the mutual fund
literature and run fund-level panel-regressions on the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993),
as well as the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) and the liquidity factor of Pa´stor and Stambaugh
(2003).14
Table 5 shows statistically significant excess monthly returns of roughly 40 basis points for
the treatment and control groups across all specifications, along with strong positive responses to
changes in the market factor. Interestingly, the literature to date has shown no positive excess
returns on hedge fund portfolios constructed from 13F holdings information.15 As noted in the
14Thanks to Ken French and Robert Stambaugh for providing these factors on their respective websites. I do
not use the Fung and Hsieh (2004) four-factor model for hedge fund returns here given that the return series is
constructed from long-only positions and does not exhibit option-like behavior found in hedge fund returns.
15See for example Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang (2013), Brown and Schwarz (2013), Gri n and Xu (2009), and Aragon
and Martin (2012).
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introduction, this dataset is compiled from proprietary sources whom have access to “best of breed”
hedge fund managers. Hence, the sample likely has an upward bias in performance, for both
treatment and control groups, which is confirmed with statistically significant excess return in
Table 5. 16
[Table 5 here]
5.2 Risk-Adjusted Returns to Overlapped Positions
One inference we can derive from excess returns to treatment group funds is that overlapped po-
sitions convey information to asset prices by way of a network of connected hedge fund managers.
To pin down this conclusion, I explore di↵erences in risk-adjusted returns between overlapped and
non-overlapped–or unique–portions of grouped manager portfolios by dividing the dataset into over-
lapping and non-overlapping stock-quarters for the treatment and control groups.
The results of these tests are shown in Table 6. In Panel A, I find the di↵erence in the
coe cient for excess returns is larger and more statistically significant for overlapped stocks between
the two groups relative to their overall respective portfolios. In Panel B, non-overlapped positions
contribute little value to the treatment group’s risk-adjusted performance, whereas for the control
group, non-overlapped stocks actually creates negative alpha of -5 basis points a month. Taken
together, overlapped positions drive excess return for both groups, but accounts for 14% more of
the excess return among connected funds (70% versus 56%). Put di↵erently, overlapped positions
drive 25% more of the abnormal return for the treatment group over that of the control group.
This suggests the treatment group may have an informational advantage over the control group
regarding certain investments that permeates through a connected network.
Supporting Pool et al. (2015) and Stein (2008), these results infer a necessary condition that
manager networks are generally active and are conveying information to asset prices. In fact, a
long/short portfolio comprised of a long position in overlapped holdings in connected portfolios
(overlapped-connceted) and a short position in non-overlapped holdings in unconnected portfolios
(unique-unconnected) generates alpha of 4.5% per year.
[Table 6 here]
16Di↵erences in the constant term between treatment and control groups is marginally insignificant at the monthly
level, but decidedly significant at the quarterly and annual horizon.
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5.3 Risk-Adjusted Returns During the 2008 Financial Crisis
On the heals of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, liquidity risk borne by hedge funds has
witnessed a significant increase in scrutiny. However, as Aragon (2007) points out, funds with more
stringent lockup periods are better able to manage illiquid positions, thereby extracting liquidity
premia for investors. Thus, funds that o↵er longer lockups should be in a better position to manage
redemption pressure during extreme market environments.
As many of the funds in this proprietary sample are not found in the commercial databases, I
cannot confirm whether di↵erential lockup terms arise between the treatment and control groups.
However, given the institutional quality of the funds found in this sample, there is little reason to
suspect sophisticated investors would accept more onerous liquidity terms among two funds who
exhibit similar signals ex-ante. Acceding to such terms, itself, is a signal that a) the investor is
informed about a manager’s distinguishing background, or b) they prefer to leave liquidity manage-
ment decisions to a manager they deem better adept at managing liquidity vis-a`-vis the performance
tradeo↵ than they themselves could do. Further, even though a fund may have more stringent lockup
provisions, the manager need not necessarily adhere to them, particularly when “haircut” fees allow
investors to redeem funds prematurely. The ability to maintain full discretion over a portfolio by
adhering to lockups during market down turns, particularly among volumes of early redemption
requests, highlights liquidity management skill even in the presence of lockup terms.
Furthermore, an extreme market shock, particularly a liquidity driven event such as the finan-
cial crisis, provides a unique setting to analyze deviations in manager behavior within a network. To
the extent that investment ideas communicated through a connected network contain no valuable
information, then adverse market conditions provide incentive for connected funds to divest from
commonly held, but non-informative, positions. Widely-held positions in a network makes them
susceptible to liquidity induced drawdowns, particularly for information-lacking positions. Accord-
ingly, the strength of a network can be tested amid an economic shock such as the financial crisis; if
the network is robust, socially communicated investment ideas in overlapped portfolios should not
exhibit liquidity weakness in the cross-section.
To analyze this setting, I employ the same risk-adjusted performance specification used before,
and add indicator variables for each quarter during the crisis (3Q 2008 - 1Q 2009). Whereas the
control group experiences a significant draw-down attributable to the market turmoil of the third
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quarter of 2008 (-2.9% per month during 3Q 2008), the treatment group exhibits no statistically
significant losses attributable to the quarter (Table 7). This result attests to di↵erentiated liquidity
management during the period of largest liquidity shock in the crisis, and is reinforced by di↵erences
in liquidity loadings between the two groups. Similar cross-sectional di↵erences remain when we
progress into the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009; the treatment group continues to
outpace the control group by generating statistically significantly di↵erent excess returns.
[Table 7 here]
Disentangling learning and network channels, Table 8 shows regression results of overlapping
(Panel A) and non-overlapping (Panel B) portfolios between the treatment and control groups.
Across overlapped investments, di↵erence between the groups remains valid in each quarter tested.
For example, during the third quarter of 2008, overlapped positions drive losses for the control
group whereas they remain insignificant for connected managers.
Further, as markets rebounded in late 2008, the treatment group posts returns twice that of
the control group attributable to similar cross-sectional shocks (1.3% vs. 0.6%), and during the
first quarter of 2009, di↵erences remain between overlapped portfolios of the two groups. Results
obtained from non-overlapping portfolio regressions in Panel B confirm those found previously; the
control group generates negative excess returns from unique investments while the treatment group
breaks even. Taken together, these results buttress evidence that overlapped portfolios among
connected funds convey information to asset prices as a result of an active network. Furthermore,
connected fund managers do not deviate from their networked investment ideas during adverse
market conditions.
[Table 8 here]
5.4 Price Discovery Among Connected Funds
Lastly, I compare the timeline of returns to overlapping positions and how networks of fund managers
respond. Following Coval and Sta↵ord (2007), I calculate cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAARs) to overlapping stocks near an event quarter. CAARs are monthly compounded di↵erences
between returns to an event-stock and the equal-weighted average return to stocks held by each
group of funds in the cross-section. I define an event quarter as when five or more funds in the
treatment and control groups, respectively, hold the same stock-quarter pairing, where the event
at time t is measured at the end of the quarter where the overlapping threshold is crossed. I
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calculate CAARs for each event-stock starting 15 months leading up to the event and for the
following 18 months.17 This allows us to see if there are di↵erential returns to overlapped positions
between the treatment and control group. Further, it provides enough horizon to determine whether
cumulative returns fully reverse, which would support a price impact story–aking to a pump-and-
dump strategy–or whether they remain above the prior price point, which would provide evidence
that privately generated information is impounding into asset prices.
[Figure 2 here]
As shown in Figure 2, CAARs for both the treatment (solid blue line) and control groups
(solid red line) increase toward the event at time t, continue to increase through the next quarter,
and begin to reverse in the following quarter. Notably, both groups see a similar trend, however,
di↵erence in CAARs between the two groups is stark; event-stocks in the treatment group achieve
CAARs above 25.3%, whereas those of the control group only reach 9.5%. Furthermore, whereas
CAARs fully reverse and become negative for the control group, they reverse only partially for
the treatment group. This indicates that information propagating through the treatment group
network is not fully transitory, and thus, conveys valuable information to asset prices.
Interestingly, the di↵erence in CAARs between the two groups (solid gray line) highlights
the di↵erential impact the treatment group has on asset prices over the control group. From this,
it is clear that di↵erences in shared portfolio choices between connected and unconnected funds
generates significant abnormal return, which persists long after the event period has passed. If
information communicated through connected funds contained no di↵erential information from that
of unconnected managers, the di↵erence in CAARs should fully reverse to zero.
Figure 2 also shows the average number of funds in each group holding the stock-quarter
surrounding the event. The average number of funds are represented by dashed lines; blue for the
treatment group and red for the control. For both groups of funds, the average number of funds
holding the event stock-quarter increases monotonically towards the event, remains high during
the following quarter, and reverts dramatically in the next quarter. This implies that funds are
buy-herding into event stocks and are able to capture the peak returns to these positions before
subsequently exiting. However, the treatment group appears to do so in a larger grouping leading
up to the event, with a delta of roughly 10% more funds participating in the event-stock for the
17Results hold when the event quarter is tested for various number of funds holding the same stock-quarter and
for di↵ering pre- and post-measurement horizons.
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treatment group. In sum, these results provide corroborating evidence that overlapped holdings
are driven by an exchange of privately generated information as suggested in Pool et al. (2015) and
Stein (2008).
6 Conclusion
Despite the expansive literature on mutual fund families, there has been little attention paid to the
linkages between connected hedge funds traced by a common employment history. Using holdings
information combined with a proprietary dataset of hedge fund manager employment histories, I
show how connected hedge fund managers express correlated investment behavior. Firstly, learned
skills from a formative mentor such as portfolios construction and trading techniques appear with
commonality across portfolios of connected members. Second, connected funds leverage their social
network by holding overlapped portfolios 48.5% more of the time than unconnected fund managers,
suggesting an active network.
I then show how connected managers di↵er their trading and allocation decisions between
uniquely and commonly held investments. My stock-level analyses on conditional herding find that
connected managers buy- and sell-herd more than unconnected managers. Furthermore, they over-
weight overlapped positions 12.4% more. This additional evidence supports the premise that an
active network among connected managers influences investment decisions.
As modeled in the “quid pro quo” framework of Stein (2008), I find that overlapped portfolios
drive risk-adjusted alpha, accounting for 70% of the excess return to the overall portfolio compared
to 56% for the control group; a 25% improvement. This finding buttresses those of Pool et al.
(2015) who find that information transfers from networked hedge fund managers to asset prices.
Further, during periods of extreme market duress when managers have an incentive to deviate from
the herd, I find connected managers maintain conviction in overlapped positions shared among the
network.
Importantly, I show that cumulative average abnormal returns to connected-overlapped stocks
of 15% is permanently conveyed to asset prices (Coval and Sta↵ord (2007)). This suggests that
incentives within networks of hedge fund managers are aligned to generate private information,
which leads to price discovery for commonly held assets in connected portfolios. I calculate that
a long/short portfolio of overlapped-connected/unique-unconnected stocks generates alpha of 4.5%
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annually.
My findings are also relevant to the fund family literature. By identifying commonality in
investment behavior among hedge fund managers connected through a shared employment ancestry,
an informal hedge fund “family” can be identified, thereby reducing costly search for institutional
investors. Furthermore, this identification can assist the institutional investor in diversifying risk
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Figure 1:  Distribution of Quarterly Holdings
This figure shows the distribution of average portfolio holdings for each fund found in the treatment group and the
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std
Number of Funds 232 232 0 42 42 0 84 84 0
Number of Positions 95 42 165 39 34 23 39 34 24
Position Weight (%) 1.05 0.21 2.45 2.58 1.59 3.39 2.57 1.60 3.37
Position Horizon (year) 0.93 0.69 0.99 0.73 0.66 0.38 0.81 0.66 0.64
Top Ten Positions (% of AUM) 58.3 56.3 22.9 64.1 61.8 18.7 63.8 61.1 17.4
Invested Long Assets ($MM) 1,239 349 2,741 1,560 729 2,484 779 318 1,222
Fund Longevity (Qtrs) 30.6 29.0 16.2 32.6 29.0 14.2 32.5 29.0 14.2
Raw Quarterly Return (%) 3.21 3.89 11.52 4.20 4.57 11.55 3.72 4.28 11.62
This table presents summary statistics by sub-group for the quarterly sample period of 2000 to 2013. The treatment group is
comprised of U.S. headquarterd long-short equity hedge funds ran by managers whom were previously employed by Tiger
Management. The unmatched sample includes all U.S. headquartered long-short equity hedge funds in my sample from which
I use to construct the matched control group. The matched control group is composed of the two nearest-neighbors match to the
treatment group after matching on (1) fund start date, (2) fund longevity, (3) average number of positions, (4) average position
weight, and (5) fund headquarter location. 
Treatment GroupUnmatched Sample Control Group
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Table 2: Portfolio Overlap
This table presents the results of the quarterly panel regression
SameNetwork 1.75*** 1.37*** 2.06*** 1.82***
(4.49) (3.38) (4.84) (4.26)
SameCity -0.19 -0.11 0.03 -0.10 -0.17 -0.02
(-0.84) (-0.50) (0.17) (-0.38) (-0.66) (-0.09)
Activist -2.68*** -4.89***
(-4.38) (-6.05)
Equity Long/Short -0.63 -1.30***
(-1.38) (-3.08)
Equity Market Neutral -1.18** -1.66***
(-2.21) (-4.33)
Event Driven -0.86 -1.02**
(-1.36) (-2.04)
Fixed Income -0.68 -0.86*
(-1.16) (-1.69)
Fund of Funds -0.21 0.52
(-0.25) (0.70)








Constant 5.39*** 5.54*** 3.48*** 4.99*** 4.91*** 2.94***
(22.85) (12.62) (10.18) (18.25) (17.49) (12.42)
R2 0.000 0.009 0.077 0.000 0.004 0.053
Observations 1,393,952 1,393,952 1,393,952 708,873 708,873 708,873
All Strategies Equity Long/Short
where PortOverlap j,k,t measures the minimum portfolio overlap between funds j and k during quarter t . 
SameNetwork j,k,t is a dummy variable equal to one if funds j and k belong to the same hedge fund network.
SameCity j,k,t is a dummy variable that is one if funds j and k are headquartered in the same city. Controls j,k,t 
is a vector of control variables that include (a) dummy variables equal to one if funds j and k pursue the
same hedge fund strategy; (b) the average assets under management (AUM) based quintiles of funds j and k 
(AUMQuintAvg ); and (c) the absolute value in the differences between AUM-based quintiles of funds j and
k (AUMQuintDiff ). Standard errors are two-way clustered at the fund level for each fund in the fund-pair
and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level,
and *** at the 1% level.  
Dependent Variable PortOverlap j,k,t PortOverlap j,k,t
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 + δ𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 + Γ′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑘,𝑡, 
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Table 3: Herding Measure 
Mean Measure ≥3 ≥5 ≥10 ≥15 ≥20
Panel A: Full Sample
HM 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Observations 74,916 41,880 13,179 4,739 1,876
BHM 12.69% 11.42% 9.56% 8.64% 8.38%
Observations 51,204 28,870 9,063 3,241 1,263
SHM 11.24% 9.96% 8.02% 7.07% 6.48%
Observations 23,712 13,010 4,116 1,498 613
BHM - SHM 1.45% 1.46% 1.54% 1.57% 1.90%
Panel B: Treatment Group
HM 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Observations 3,335 825 127 27
BHM 15.11% 14.27% 11.02% 9.58%
Observations 2,449 597 87 15
SHM 15.60% 12.96% 9.28% 8.77%
Observations 886 228 40 12
BHM - SHM -0.48% 1.31% 1.75% 0.81%
Panel C: Control Group
HM 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Observations 2,443 346 8
BHM 14.56% 11.94% 7.12%
Observations 1,640 229 5
SHM 11.69% 10.76% 7.95%
Observations 803 117 4
BHM - SHM 2.87% 1.18% -0.84%
Panel D: Differences in Conditional Means
BHM 0.55*** 2.33*** 3.91*** 9.58***
tstat (2.71) (4.35) (2.20) (6.19)
SHM 3.91*** 2.20*** 1.32 8.77***
tstat (11.22) (3.32) (0.31) (4.75)
Funds Trading Stock-Quarter Pairs
This table presents the results of the herding measure for each of the treatment (Panel B),
matched control (Panel C), and unmatched groups (Panel A). The herding measure comes from
Lakonishok et al. (1992), and is expressed in Wermers (1999) as
where, p i,t is the proportion of funds buying stock i in quarter t relative to all funds trading the
same stock-quarter. E[p i,t ] is subtracted from p i,t to expose herding variation relative to
unperterbed coincident trading that would be expected in a given quarter. The second term,
E|p i,t -E[p i,t ]| , is the adjustment factor to allow for random variation around the proportion of
buyers over the full sample period where, in expectation, no herding arises. Measures reported
are average values. HM represents the average of the herding measure. BHM represents the
average of the conditional buy-side herding measure. SHM represents the average of the
conditional sell-side herding measure. BHM-SHM represents the average spread to a portfolio
of conditional herding measures; buy-side minus sell-side . * indicates significance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
𝐻𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑝𝑖,𝑡] − 𝐸 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑝𝑖,𝑡]  , 
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Table 4: Adjusted Weight Panel Regressions
This table presents the results of the quarterly panel regression
Dependent Variable
Constant 2.15*** 2.23*** 2.17*** 2.24***
(19.55) (16.78) (19.95) (16.99)
Overlapi,j,t 0.83*** 0.69*** 0.78*** 0.66***
(11.09) (8.87) (10.37) (8.27)
Treatmentj -0.26 -0.21
(-1.10) (-0.90)
Overlapi,t * Treatmentj 0.42** 0.36**
(2.44) (2.14)
R2 0.015 0.016 0.023 0.024
Observations 156,304 156,304 156,304 156,304
Date FE No No Yes Yes
where AdjustedWeight i,j,t is the position weight of stock i in fund j in quarter t, adjusted by relative portfolio
market capitalizations. The adjustment factor is stock i 's market capitalization at the end of quarter t held by
fund j , scaled by the sum of the market capitalizations for each stock held in the fund at the end of the
quarter. Overlap i,j,t is equal to one if two or more funds hold the same stock-quarter pair. Note that
Overlap i,j,t is measured for each group separately. Treatment j is equal to one for all hedge funds in the
treatment group, and zero for all control funds. Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are clustered at the fund-stock pair level and t-statistics are reported below the
coefficients.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
AdjustedWeight i,j,t
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =   𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗 + 𝛾(𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗) + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖.𝑗,𝑡, 
33
Table 5: Risk-Adjusted Performance
This table presents the results of the fund-month panel regression
Alpha 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.32***
(6.54) (6.89) (6.14) (6.98) (7.50) (6.38)
MKT 0.86*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.82*** 0.82***
(28.22) (30.32) (30.52) (34.71) (36.03) (35.95)
SMB 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.22***
(4.40) (4.55) (4.20) (6.86) (7.11) (6.66)
HML -0.16** -0.18** -0.16* 0.04 0.02 0.05
(-2.13) (-2.39) (-2.00) (0.78) (0.35) (1.02)
MOM -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06***
(-2.95) (-3.14) (-5.02) (-6.02)
LIQ 0.05** 0.10***
(2.02) (5.10)
R2 0.557 0.559 0.561 0.590 0.592 0.598
Observations 4,801 4,801 4,801 8,581 8,581 8,581
where (R j,t - R f,t ) represents the excess return to portfolio j during month t . Monthly portfolio returns are
constructed from all stocks held by fund j at the end of quarter t , multiplied by weighted returns to each
stock over the ensuing three months. Risk adjustment factors include the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model (MKT , SMB , and HML ), plus the momentum factor of Carhart (1997; MOM ), and the
liquidity factor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003; LIQ ). MKT represents excess return to the market factor.
SMB is the spread return to a portfolio of small market capitalization stocks minus large capitalization
stocks. HML is the spread return to a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market
stocks. MOM is the spread return to a portfolio of stocks with prior positive returns minus stocks with
prior negative returns. LIQ is the factor for cross-sectional permanent liquidity innovations. Differences in
Alphas between the treatment and control group are significantly different from one another at the
quarterly (5% level) and annual (1% level) frequency, but marginally insignificantly different at the
monthly frequency shown here. Standard errors are clustered two-ways by fund and date, with t-statistics
reported below the coefficients. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1%
level.  
Treatment Group Control Group
R j  - R f R j  - R fDependent Variable
(𝑅𝑗,𝑡−𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, 
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Table 6: Overlap vs. Non-Overlap Risk-Adjusted Performance
This table presents the results of the fund-month panel regression
Panel A: Overlap Risk-Adjusted Performance
Dependent Variable
Alpha 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.18***
(5.92) (6.14) (5.76) (7.70) (7.74) (6.72)
MKT 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(16.99) (16.38) (16.38) (24.34) (24.41) (24.47)
SMB 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05***
(5.16) (5.35) (5.17) (5.38) (5.43) (4.87)
HML -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.11*** 0.04* 0.04* 0.05***
(-3.68) (-4.02) (-3.65) (1.96) (1.78) (2.88)
MOM -0.02* -0.02** -0.01 -0.01**
(-1.96) (-2.19) (-1.64) (-2.54)
LIQ 0.03** 0.05***
(2.44) (4.16)
R2 0.513 0.514 0.515 0.450 0.450 0.455
Observations 4,730 4,730 4,730 8,364 8,364 8,364
Panel B: Non-Overlap Risk-Adjusted Performance
Dependent Variable
Alpha 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.54) (0.94) (0.63) (-4.23) (-3.76) (-3.97)
MKT 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(11.25) (10.77) (10.79) (19.91) (19.47) (19.46)
SMB 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(3.19) (3.32) (3.15) (3.22) (3.88) (3.85)
HML -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-1.24) (-1.50) (-1.27) (0.26) (-0.60) (-0.45)
MOM -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(-3.37) (-3.45) (-3.96) (-4.01)
LIQ 0.02 0.00
(0.81) (1.22)
R2 0.303 0.307 0.307 0.156 0.166 0.166
Observations 4,706 4,706 4,706 5,373 5,373 5,373
Treatment Group Control Group
where (R j,t - R f,t ) represents the excess return to portfolio j during month t . Monthly portfolio returns are constructed from all
stocks held by fund j at the end of quarter t , multiplied by weighted returns to each stock over the ensuing three months. Risk
adjustment factors include the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (MKT , SMB , and HML ), plus the momentum factor
of Carhart (1997; MOM ), and the liquidity factor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003; LIQ ). MKT represents excess return to the
market factor. SMB is the spread return to a portfolio of small market capitalization stocks minus large capitalization stocks.
HML is the spread return to a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market stocks. MOM is the spread
return to a portfolio of stocks with prior positive returns minus stocks with prior negative returns. LIQ is the factor for cross-
sectional permanent liquidity innovations. Differences in Alphas between the treatment and control group are significantly
different from one another at the quarterly (5% level) and annual (1% level) frequency, but marginally insignificantly different at
the monthly frequency shown here. Standard errors are clustered two-ways by fund and date, with t-statistics reported below
the coefficients.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
Treatment Group Control Group
R j  - R f R j  - R f
R j  - R f R j  - R f
(𝑅𝑗,𝑡−𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, 
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Table 7: Liquidity Management During the Global Financial Crisis
This table presents the results of the fund-month panel regression
Alpha 0.45*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.28*** 0.30***
(6.47) (4.96) (5.33) (8.15) (5.24) (5.79)
MKT 0.83*** 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.80*** 0.83*** 0.83***
(29.93) (32.55) (30.90) (36.11) (37.36) (35.90)
SMB 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(4.55) (4.04) (4.23) (7.79) (6.48) (6.72)
HML -0.16* -0.15* -0.14* 0.07 0.07 0.07
(-1.93) (-1.74) (-1.68) (1.47) (1.33) (1.31)
MOM -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.04** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(-3.20) (-3.10) (-2.46) (-6.92) (-5.95) (-5.05)
LIQ 0.05* 0.07** 0.04 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.09***







R2 0.561 0.562 0.562 0.603 0.599 0.599
Observations 4,801 4,801 4,801 8,581 8,581 8,581
during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 where (Rj,t- Rf,t) represents the excess return to portfolio j during month t.
Monthly portfolio returns are constructed from all stocks held by fund j at the end of quarter t, multiplied by weighted returns
to each stock over the ensuing three months. Risk adjustment factors include the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model
(MKT , SMB , and HML ), plus the momentum factor of Carhart (1997; MOM ), and the liquidity factor of Pástor and Stambaugh
(2003; LIQ). MKT represents excess return to the market factor. SMB is the spread return to a portfolio of small market
capitalization stocks minus large capitalization stocks. HML is the spread return to a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks
minus low book-to-market stocks. MOM is the spread return to a portfolio of stocks with prior positive returns minus stocks
with prior negative returns. LIQ is the factor for cross-sectional permanent liquidity innovations. Indicators variables Q3_2008-
Q2_2009 are equal to one for each of the respective quarters during the crisis. Standard errors are clustered two-ways by fund
and date, with t-statistics are reported below the coefficients. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and ***
at the 1% level.  
Dependent Variable
Treatment Group Control Group
R j  - R f R j  - R f
(𝑅𝑗,𝑡−𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑄3_2008𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑄4_2008𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑄1_2009𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗 ,t, 
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Table 8: Overlap vs. Non-Overlap Liquidity Management During the Global Financial Crisis
This table presents the results of the fund-month panel regression
Panel A: Overlap Risk-Adjusted Performance
Dependent Variable
Alpha 0.32*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(6.10) (4.98) (5.04) (8.19) (5.80) (5.69)
MKT 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(16.87) (16.80) (16.46) (25.91) (24.25) (24.59)
SMB 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(5.72) (5.00) (5.28) (6.44) (4.68) (5.02)
HML -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07***
(-3.41) (-3.34) (-2.94) (3.65) (3.28) (3.67)
MOM -0.03** -0.02** -0.01 -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01
(-2.35) (-2.13) (-1.21) (-3.50) (-2.50) (-1.04)
LIQ 0.03** 0.04*** 0.02 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04***







R2 0.516 0.518 0.518 0.463 0.456 0.459
Observations 4,730 4,730 4,730 8,364 8,364 8,364
Panel B: Non-Overlap Risk-Adjusted Performance
Dependent Variable
Alpha 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.74) (0.16) (0.51) (-3.75) (-4.21) (-4.28)
MKT 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(10.28) (11.02) (10.63) (19.44) (19.18) (20.23)
SMB 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(3.25) (3.06) (3.16) (3.83) (3.82) (3.92)
HML -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-1.24) (-1.14) (-1.20) (-0.36) (-0.21) (0.02)
MOM -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(-3.41) (-3.43) (-3.29) (-4.03) (-3.99) (-3.64)
LIQ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00







R2 0.307 0.308 0.307 0.167 0.167 0.168
Observations 4,706 4,706 4,706 5,373 5,373 5,373
Treatment Group Control Group
during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 where (Rj,t- Rf,t) represents the excess return to portfolio j during month t. Monthly portfolio
returns are constructed from all stocks held by fund j at the end of quarter t, multiplied by weighted returns to each stock over the ensuing
three months. Risk adjustment factors include the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (MKT , SMB , and HML ), plus the
momentum factor of Carhart (1997; MOM ), and the liquidity factor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003; LIQ). MKT represents excess return
to the market factor. SMB is the spread return to a portfolio of small market capitalization stocks minus large capitalization stocks. HML 
is the spread return to a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market stocks. MOM is the spread return to a
portfolio of stocks with prior positive returns minus stocks with prior negative returns. LIQ is the factor for cross-sectional permanent
liquidity innovations. Indicators variables Q3_2008-Q2_2009 are equal to one for each of the respective quarters during the crisis.
Standard errors are clustered two-ways by fund and date, with t-statistics are reported below the coefficients. * indicates significance at
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
Treatment Group Control Group
R j  - R f R j  - R f
R j  - R f R j  - R f
(𝑅𝑗,𝑡−𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑄3_2008𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑄4_2008𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑄1_2009𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗 ,t, 
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Abstract 
Meeting heterogeneous investor needs, mutual fund families now offer ETF versions of their index 
funds. Using a twin based study, we find mutual fund twins and their families benefit from the 
relationship, while the effect is ambiguous for ETF twins. Compared to the average index mutual 
fund, twins have a 23% lower tax burden driven by a 69% lower long-term capital gains yield. 
Unrealized capital gains also decrease by 7%. ETF twin investors face higher long-term capital gains 
yields and unrealized capital gains, but are compensated with lower total expense ratios. Overall, 





On the supply side of the mutual fund industry two stylized facts exist: (1) the majority of funds 
are organized as Open-End Funds (OEFs) and (2) they operate within a fund family. The prevalence 
of these industry features has emerged despite well-documented limitations to both. For instance, 
Stein (2006) theorizes that the dominance of OEFs, may be socially excessive due to the known 
externalities of trading, brokerage, and operating expenses, and unexpected capital gains imposed 
by short-term traders on other fund investors (Chordia (1996)). Traditional mutual funds organize as 
families to earn rents from economies of scale (Baumol et al. (1989)) and to cater to heterogeneous 
investor needs (Nanda, Narayanan and Warther (2000)). However, by organizing in a family 
structure, manager incentives may be distorted (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006)) as evidenced by 
cross-fund subsidization (Bhattacharya, Lee, and Pool (2013)). Using a twin-based study to 
overcome endogeneity concerns, this paper contributes to the literature by examining an emerging 
trend in the organization of mutual funds: the incorporation of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) into 
a fund family. 
The features that distinguish ETFs from their OEF peers helps mitigate the impact of 
externalities on fund investors. ETFs are exchange traded and rely on in-kind creation and 
redemption, such that investors bear their own transaction-induced costs and the fund itself rarely 
has to transact in the underlying. Thus, ETFs generally have higher levels of transparency, greater 
tax efficiencies, and lower management fees (Poterba and Shoven (2002)). These features have 
attracted broad array of investors to the new product, resulting in ETFs underpinning the recent 
trend toward index investing from active management. In fact, ETFs now represent 48% of the $4.23 
trillion indexed funds market that has benefited from net inflows of $1.2 trillion since 2007. Of this, 
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net new cash flows to U.S. domestic equity ETFs are almost double that of index mutual funds.1 In 
light of such demand for ETFs, traditional mutual fund families face intense pressure to offer ETFs 
to retain existing shareholders and to attract new ones. 
Fund families face a conflict. In effort to increase flows to the family, they can introduce ETFs to 
meet investor demand, but they do so at the risk of cannibalizing flows to higher fee OEFs within 
the family.2 Yet, the operational efficiencies of ETFs allow mutual fund families to potentially offset 
tax externalities imposed on traditional fund investors by short-term traders. Using a twin-based 
identification strategy similar to Nohel, Wang, and Zheng (2010), Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi (2010), 
and Evans and Fahlenbrach (2012) we obtain a clean setting to test the implications of the 
proliferation of this alternative fund structure on the traditional mutual fund industry and 
mainstream investors.3 Here, twins are defined as an index mutual fund and ETF in the same fund 
family that follow the same benchmark; essentially, twins are identical funds differentiated only by 
vehicle structure.4 Our goal is to understand why fund families may introduce this share-class 
structure given the conflict it poses, and then consider the implications for mutual fund and ETF 
investors who exhibit differing preferences, with a focus on the tax, expense, and flow implications.  
The tax efficiencies of ETFs stem from their use of a technique known as “in-kind creation and 
redemption,” which are non-taxable events involving the exchange of a unit of ETF shares for a pre-
specified basket of the underlying. 5  These exchanges occur only between the ETF sponsor and its 
Authorized Participants (APs), and enable the ETF to minimize both realized and unrealized capital 
                                                          
1 ICI Factobook 2016 
2 Fidelity infamously resisted offering ETFs until recently. Krouse, Sarah, January 3, 2017, Wall Street Journal. “Fidelity Embraces 
What It Once Avoided: The ETF” 
3 http://www.google.com/patents/US20110258089 
4 The correlation of annual returns for the mutual fund and ETF twins is over 99% 
5 Specifically, Section 852(b)(6) of the US Tax Code relieves registered investment companies (RICs) from Section 311(b), which 




gains distributions. Because mutual fund managers rarely use the in-kind feature (Poterba and 
Shoven (2002)), this leads to a tax externality because the tax burden of mutual fund investors is 
dependent on the behavior of others (Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000)). When a mutual fund 
manager sells shares due to reallocation or to meet redemption requests, the remaining shareholders 
bear the tax burden on the fund’s realized capital gains. The unique structure of twin funds allows 
fund families to capitalize on differences in investor preferences. Fund families that incorporate 
ETFs can exploit the tax efficiencies of ETFs to the benefit of their higher-fee paying mutual funds in 
two ways. First, is through a structure that Vanguard patented making the ETF a separate share 
class of the larger mutual fund.6 As noted by Senior Investment Advisor at Vanguard, Joel Dickson, 
the structure uses the ETF’s in-kind mechanism to get “rid of gains.”7 Second, ETFs and mutual fund 
twins exist as distinct funds within the fund family. In this setting, mutual funds may respond to a 
redemption request by delivering the basket of shares to the ETF in exchange for a creation unit of 
the ETF, typically 50,000 to 100,000 shares. The mutual fund can then sell the ETF shares into the 
market, using the funds from the sale to meet the cash redemption. This strategy is possible because 
the majority of fund sponsors are also APs for their own ETFs.8  
We find that mutual fund families who introduce twin funds are able to exploit the tax efficiency 
of ETFs to lower their current and potential tax distributions. In fact, the use of ETFs by mutual fund 
twins results in a 22.8% reduction in the tax burden, or over $300 billion dollars in tax savings for 
mutual fund investors. Driving this lower tax burden is a 69.4% savings in the long-term capital 
gains distributions relative to the average mutual fund. Future taxable distributions – measured as 
                                                          
6 US Patent Number 2002/0128947 A1, filed March 7, 2001 and published September 12, 2002  
7 https://advisors.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/Efficiency_transcript2.pdf 
8 The cost basis for acquirers of the underlying and ETF shares exchanged is the net asset value (NAV) at market close 
(Forstenhausler (2010), Gastineau (2005)). Therefore, rather than paying taxes on the accumulated share gains of the underlying, the 
mutual fund instead pays taxes on the difference between the NAV and the price at which the ETF is sold in the market. 
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reported 2014 unrealized capital gains scaled by total assets – are 7% lower for mutual fund twins. 
For ETFs, the overall tax burden is unaffected by this arrangement, but investors in ETF twins face 
higher long-term and unrealized capital gains. 
Furthermore, we find that fund families do not fully pass on economies of scale benefits from 
managing two identical pools of assets. While ETF twins have 20% lower expense ratios, the expense 
ratios for mutual funds twins are not significantly different than their non-twin peers. Finally, we 
find that mutual fund and ETF twins generate 50% and 25% greater flows, respectively, than their 
non-twin peers. This suggests that fund families benefit by appealing to investor heterogeneity 
through this form of product diversification. 
Since the introduction of a new investment is not random, we use two identification strategies to 
examine the implications of managing mutual fund and ETF twins. In our first test, we use a fixed 
effects model on the full panel and use Morningstar category fixed effects to account for unobserved 
style based heterogeneity (Bergstresser and Pontiff (2013)). We include year fixed effects to control 
for general market trends and the cyclicality of fund distributions (Sialm and Zhang (2015)). In our 
second specification, we take advantage of the recency of ETFs. Since index mutual funds date back 
to the 1970s and ETFs were only introduced in the early 1990s, there are several mutual funds that 
were in operation prior to the introduction of its ETF twin. We use these mutual funds as our 
treatment group in a difference-in-difference specification. For this test, we use non-twin mutual 
funds matched on Morningstar category and fund size as our control group.  
This paper is contributes to three broad strands of the literature: fund family, tax burden, and 
ETF administration. First, the fund family literature has examined the impact of multiple funds 
operating within a family structure. It is well known that mutual funds benefit from economies of 
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scale from organizing as a family (Baumol et al. (1989), Khorana and Servaes (2012), Khorana and 
Servaes (1999)) and by offering  product differentiation families can appeal to investor heterogeneity 
(Massa (2003)), but limited evidence that families pass the savings on to investors (Freeman and 
Brown (2001)). Despite potential benefits, family relationships may lead managers to act in the best 
interest of the overall family, rather than the individual fund. To date the literature suggests that 
families engage in cross-fund subsidization by favoring high-fee and high performing mutual funds 
(Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006)) or providing liquidity to family funds under stress to benefit the 
family as a whole (Bhattacharya, Lee, and Pool (2013)). We add to the fund family literature by 
studying the incorporation of ETFs, a distinct investment vehicle, into mutual fund families. Our 
results identify a new cross-fund subsidization feature found in the OEF-ETF twin structure, while 
showing that offering ETFs does not lead to cannibalization of flows for higher-fee index funds.  
The second strand of related literature is on the influence of taxes. Generally, papers find that 
taxes are an important consideration for mutual fund managers and investors alike. Dickson and 
Shoven (1993) document that capital gains distributions significantly impact after-tax returns, while 
Sialm and Zhang (2015) show that tax-efficient asset management generates superior before- and 
after-tax performance. Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) find that money flows to funds that are able 
to deliver lower tax burdens relative to funds with similar pre-tax returns. Sialm and Starks (2012) 
find that mutual fund managers consider the tax status of their investors when determining 
distributions and holdings. Beyond, realized capital gain, Barclay, Pearson, and Weisbach (1998) 
document empirically and theoretically that unrealized capital gains are an important consideration 
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for fund managers. By offering ETFs, we find that traditional mutual fund families are able to 
mitigate a major externality imposed on tax sensitive investors.9 
Finally, as the assets under management by ETFs have increased, so too has the academic 
community’s interest in the investment vehicle. To date, the majority of studies have examined the 
impact of ETF membership on various characteristics of the underlying. ETFs are shown to decrease 
liquidity (Hamm (2011)), increase volatility (Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2014)), and lead to 
greater co-movement (Da and Shive (2013)) for constituent stocks. Dannhauser (2016) shows that 
ETF constituency lower corporate bond yields due to a migration of liquidity traders from the 
underlying market to the basket security. Two recent papers have focused on ETF administration. 
Specifically, Blocher and Whaley (2014) document that ETFs generate significant revenues from 
security lending. In perhaps the most closely related paper to ours, Cheng, Massa, and Zhang (2014) 
investigate the consequences of ETFs affiliated with banks. They find that ETFs leverage information 
from banks’ lending activities, thereby helping the banks’ own mutual funds through cross-trading, 
while supporting the banks’ stock price. Importantly, their study focuses on European ETFs, which 
are synthetically replicated using swaps. 
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
This section summarizes the sources for our data, describes the methodology used to identify 
mutual fund and ETF twins, defines the tax burden, and presents summary statistics. 
 
                                                          
9 Mutual fund family cross-subsidizations (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) and Bhattacharya, Lee, and Pool (2013) ); side-by-side 





Our annual data covers U.S. equity index mutual funds and ETFs over the period 1997 to 2014 
from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund database. The CRSP database includes mutual 
fund characteristics such as fund returns, assets under management, fund dividends, long-term and 
short-term capital gains distributions, fees, and investment objectives. Since, nearly all ETFs are 
passive investment vehicles, we restrict the sample to include only index funds. In particular, we use 
the index_fund_flag variable of CRSP to retain pure index funds or index-based funds. Since many 
funds contain multiple share classes, we aggregate variables by asset-weighting the individual share 
classes. The only variables that are summed over individual share classes are total assets and total 
2014 unrealized capital gains, which we obtain from Morningstar Direct. We account for the share 
class features of Vanguard that includes an ETF under the same fund as the mutual fund classes. To 
do so, we aggregate at the fund and structure level, resulting in a mutual fund and an ETF 
observation for a single fund. We also exclude fund liquidation years and require that a fund has a 
positive tax burden for at least one year of our sample.10 
We merge the CRSP data with data from Morningstar Direct on fund CUSIP. From the sample of 
CRSP index funds we further refine the data by eliminating all inverse and enhanced funds using 
the Morningstar category and fund name. We find the index followed by the remaining funds from 
three sources. First, we use Morningstar Direct to obtain the benchmarks by matching on CUSIP, 
then by ticker. For the funds with no Morningstar entry, we develop an algorithm to identify 
commonly followed indices using the mutual fund names. For instance, we search fund names for 
keywords, such as, S&P 500, MidCap 400 Value, or Russell 2000 Growth, to identify the benchmarks 
                                                          
10 Results are robust to the inclusion of liquidation years and funds without distributions. 
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S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 Value Index, and Russell 2000 Growth Index, respectively. Finally, we 
hand collect index benchmark data for approximately 500 funds using prospectuses. We delete any 
funds without an identifiable benchmark. For funds with hand-collected benchmarks, we use the 
Morningstar data to assign a Morningstar category on benchmark.  
Finally, the time series of tax rates on dividend, short-term, and long-term capital gains are 
sourced from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).11 The marginal rates are only 
available up to 2013 as of February 26, 2015. As a consequence, our tax burden tests are run for 1997 
to 2013 despite having information on the distribution yields for 2014. 
2.2. Identification of Mutual Fund and ETF Twins 
A mutual fund and ETF are identified as twins if they are in the same fund family and follow 
the same index. Essentially, twins are the exact same fund with different structures. For the majority 
of management company and index combinations this selection process results in a single mutual 
fund and a single ETF. However, in select cases a fund family may run many mutual funds 
following the same benchmark. For instance, Vanguard has an ETF, and three open-ended funds (an 
index fund, an institutional fund, and a tax-managed fund) that all follow the S&P 500. In these 
instances, we consider all three mutual funds as broad matches. However, in each case of multiples 
we identify the true twin as either the oldest mutual fund, or in the case of Vanguard, the mutual 
fund that contains the ETF as a share class. In total we identify seventy-four twin combinations 
composed of 152 distinct funds. The correlation of mutual fund and ETF twin returns pre and post 
expenses are 99.90% and 99.86%, respectively. Correlations that are essentially one confirm our 
claims that twins are identical funds distinguished only by their structure. Of the seventy-four 




twins, forty-eight are administered by Vanguard. While Vanguard is a dominant manager in this 
study, we argue that it is important to understand how this family operates since their assets at the 
end of 2014 were in excess of the entire hedge fund industry.12 Furthermore, we categorize the twins 
based on the timeline of introduction. Thirty-one of the twin fund combinations began as an open-
end mutual fund, with the ETF added to the family at least two years after the mutual fund 
introduction. Eight began as ETFs with the mutual fund following at least two years after. The 
remaining thirty-five twins introduced the ETF and mutual fund in the same year.  
We further restrict the sample to include only funds in the same Morningstar category as the 
twins. We also delete State Street’s S&P 500 funds, so that the SPDR S&P 500 ETF, commonly 
referred to by its ticker, SPY, does not dominate our ETF results. We are left with 8,503 fund-years 
representing 617 ETFs and 437 mutual funds. Over 13% of the sample fund-months are associated 
with a twin arrangement. 
2.3. Tax Burden 
Mutual funds and ETFs are both registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, making 
them pass through entities. Thus on an annual basis, funds distribute capital gains and dividend 
income to shareholders. If an investment company distributes all of its investment income to its 
shareholders, the company itself will have no tax liability. The distributions are taxable for investors 
who hold the funds in a taxable account. Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000) describe this as an 
externality, since the tax burden of mutual fund investors depends on the behavior of others. Due to 
their liberal use of in-kind rather than cash distributions, ETFs are considered a more tax efficient 
alternative to traditional mutual funds. Traditional mutual funds have the ability to use in-kind 




redemption, but rarely if ever utilize the feature. At the fund level, the U.S. Tax Code relieves the 
ETF from any tax consequences related to the distribution of appreciated assets when made in 
response to an investor demand. Since redemptions are met with a tax-free exchange of the basket of 
securities in return for the ETF shares, the fund does not incur capital gains which would need to be 
distributed to investors. In fact, ETF sponsors rarely need to transact in the underlying, thereby 
reducing the potential of incurring taxable capital gains.   
We follow Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) and Sialm (2009) in computing the tax burden (𝑇𝐵𝑓,𝑡) 
for fund, 𝑓, at time, 𝑡. The tax burden is the sum of the marginal investor’s tax liabilities on the 
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= (𝑌𝑓,𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑉 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑉) + (𝑌𝑓,𝑡𝐿𝐶𝐺 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐿𝐶𝐺) + (𝑌𝑓,𝑡𝑆𝐶𝐺 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑆𝐶𝐺), 
where 𝑌𝑓,𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑉, 𝑌𝑓,𝑡𝐿𝐶𝐺, and 𝑌𝑓,𝑡𝑆𝐶𝐺 are the fund’s dividend yield, long-term capital gains yield, and short-
term capital gains yield, respectively. 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑉, 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡𝐿𝐶𝐺, and 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑆𝐶𝐺 are the tax rates on dividends, and 
long-term and short-term capital gains. Tax rates are computed as the weighted averages of the 
marginal tax rates of investors in different tax brackets, where the weights correspond to the amount 
of declared dividends and capital gains (Feenberg and Coutts (1993)). 
The CRSP mutual fund database provides the level of distributions per share by type. Dividend 
distributions by mutual funds are made net of fund expenses. By definition, short-term gains are for 
investments held by the fund for less than one year. Long-term capital gains are generally on 
positions held for over a year. If the term of the capital gain is not specified, we follow Sialm and 




taxes are not charged for untaxed or tax-exempt dividends. The tax burden can be interpreted as the 
portion of the fund’s previous value that an investor pays in taxes.  
We are also interested in the unrealized capital gains disclosed in annual reports. Unrealized 
capital gain, referred to as the tax overhang, is equal to the cumulative price appreciation of the fund 
net of distributions. And in expectation, lower capital gains overhang will reduce future taxable 
fund distributions. We collect 2014 reported unrealized capital gains at the share class level from 
Morningstar Direct. Unfortunately, Morningstar Direct does not retain historical values of this 
variable. Although a time-series would be preferred, since unrealized capital gains is cumulative we 
believe that the results using only 2014 data are valid. Therefore, we compute, 𝑈𝑁𝑅𝑓,2014, as the total 
reported unrealized capital gains in fund f as a percentage of total fund assets. We also considered 
computation of unrealized capital gains burdens computed in the literature by Bergstresser and 
Pontiff (2013), Odean (1998) and Sialm and Starks (2012). However, each of these measures relies on 
an assumption about the accounting method employed by a fund. Generally, they assume “smart” 
tax realization strategies, with the highest-basis shares sold first. This assumption would bias us 
against finding results, as the use of ETFs by mutual funds would raise the possibility of a change in 
strategies. Therefore, we use reported unrealized capital gains. 
2.4. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for our data. Panel A documents the number of mutual 
funds, ETFs, and twins of both types in each year of the study. The first twin arrangement was 
created by the first ETF, SPY, in 1993, which is excluded from our data. In our setting, the first twin 
was introduced in 2000. The number of ETF twins has grown from one in 2000 to 68 in 2014. 
50 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
Panel B of table 1 contains the mean value of different characteristics of the funds in our study. 
The panel shows that twins are generally created by larger families and have lower overall expense 
ratios. Mutual fund and ETF twins also have more assets under management and lower tax burdens 
than their non-twin peers. Interestingly, the average unrealized capital gains for mutual fund twins 
is lower than non-twin mutual funds, but for ETF twins it is significantly greater. These summary 
results on the capital gains overhang support the intuition provided by Barclay, Pearson, and 
Weisbach (1998). The lower unrealized capital gains of mutual funds attract new investors, while 
ETF managers bear the higher capital gains overhang as the capital gains are unlikely to be realized. 
3. Empirical Analysis of Mutual Fund and ETF Twins 
In this section we study the implications of a twin relationship for investors. In particular we 
examine the consequences of side-by-side management on the total tax burden, the long-term and 
short-term capital gains yields, the capital gains overhang, the overall expense ratio, the 12b-1 
distribution fees, the management fees, and annual flows. To address endogeneity concerns related 
to the introduction of new investment vehicles, we execute two identification strategies: a fixed 
effects model and a difference-in-difference specification. The following subsections discuss each of 
the methodologies and results in greater detail. 
3.1. Fixed Effects Model 
Our fixed effects model uses both Morningstar category and year fixed effects to account for 
unobserved style related heterogeneity (Bergstresser and Pontiff (2013)), and secular trends over our 
sample period. In this model, we regress one of our dependent variables on three binary variables of 
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interest and covariates specified in the literature. The independent variables that we consider are the 
overall tax burden, 𝑇𝐵𝑓,𝑡, the long-term capital gains yield, 𝑌𝑓,𝑡𝐿𝐶𝐺, and the short-term capital gains 
yield, 𝑌𝑓,𝑡𝑆𝐶𝐺. We are also interested in the unrealized capital gains of the fund measured as a 
percentage of total assets, 𝑈𝑁𝑅𝑓,2014. 
Additionally, in our study of fees paid by investors, we consider the overall expense ratio, 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑓,𝑡, and its major components, the distribution fee, 12𝑏1𝑓,𝑡, and the management fee, 
𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑓,𝑡. In particular, we execute the following specification 
𝑌𝑓,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐹𝑓 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑋𝑓,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑠,𝑡, 
where , 𝑌𝑓,𝑠,𝑡, is the value of one of our dependent variables for fund 𝑓 in style 𝑠 in year 𝑡. 𝑀𝐹𝑓 is 
equal to one for a mutual fund and zero for an ETF. This dummy variable accounts for differences 
between the tax distributions, fees, and flows of mutual funds relative to ETFs. 𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 is set to 
one for all years that a mutual fund operates as a twin, and 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 is set to one for all years that 
an ETF operates as a twin. Both values are zero otherwise. For contemporaneous twins, 𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 
and 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 are always equal to one. For twins where the mutual fund or ETF existed on its own 
for at least two years, the covariate is equal to zero until the twin is introduced. These two dummy 
variables measure the difference between the outcome variable for twins relative to that of their 
peers of the same investment vehicle. For instance, 𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 shows a differential effect of mutual 
funds operating with a twin relative to that of all stand-alone mutual funds. 𝑋𝑓,𝑡 is the vector of 
controls including the log of fund size, the log of family index assets, and fund age (in years). 𝜂𝑠 is 
the Morningstar category fixed effect. Since many of our twin funds are contemporaneous starts, we 
do not use fund fixed effects. Doing so would exclude the contemporaneous twins from our study 




3.1.1. Tax Effect Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the tax fixed effects panel regressions. The first column reports 
results without the two twin dummies to first identify whether ETFs are truly more tax efficient as 
frequently claimed by practitioners. For the remaining columns, the dependent variable is overall 
tax burden for columns 2 and 3, the long-term capital gains yield for columns 4 and 5, the short-term 
capital gains yield for columns 6 and 7, and the unrealized capital gains for columns 8 and 9. For 
each of the regression pairs, the latter column includes the covariates discussed above.  
[Insert Table 2] 
In column 1, the coefficient on the mutual fund dummy, 𝑀𝐹, is positive and significant, 
empirically confirming that mutual funds have higher tax burdens than ETFs. The coefficient on 
𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛 in both columns 2 and 3 is negative and significant, suggesting that mutual funds are able 
to use their ETF twin to lower the tax burdens. After controlling for observables, the coefficient on 
𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛 is insignificant, suggesting that the overall tax burden is unaffected by this family 
relationship.  
We examine two of the components of tax burden to determine the driver of the relationship; 
long- and short-term capital gains yield. We do not consider the dividend yield because index funds 
do not have control over the constituents and their dividend policy. Furthermore, dividend 
distributions are made net of expenses. As expected, we find that the lower overall tax burden is 
being driven entirely by a reduction in the long-term capital gains yield for mutual fund twins. Also, 
the results indicate that the arrangement leads to higher long-term capital gains for ETF investors. 
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The short-term capital gains yield of both mutual fund and ETF twins is unaffected by the 
relationship.  
3.1.2.  The Expense Effect 
Having shown above that mutual funds benefit from having an ETF twin, we now examine if 
any economies of scale from managing two identical pools of assets are passed on to investors in the 
form of lower fees. Table 3 shows the findings of our fixed effects panel regressions. As above, 
column 1 excludes the twin dummies to document a general difference in expenses for mutual funds 
and ETFs. Columns 2 and 3 have the total expense ratio as the dependent variable. Columns 4 and 5 
use 12b-1 fees as the left-hand variable. 12b-1 fees are expenses charged directly to the assets of the 
fund for marketing and distribution. Finally, columns 6 and 7 use management fees as the 
dependent variable. The management fee is paid directly to the fund’s advisor, and as claimed by 
Wahal and Wang (2011), is a clean measure of the price of the services provided by the advisor. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Column 1 confirms that ETFs generally have lower expense ratios than their mutual fund peers, 
which supports general market commentary on ETFs relative to mutual funds. The lower expense 
ratio is often attributed to the relative ease of ETF management since the managers themselves rarely 
trade in the underlying markets. Column 2 suggests that investors in mutual fund twins may have 
lower total expense ratios. However, the result is only robust for ETF twins after the inclusion of the 
controls of fund size, family size, and age. In column 3, we find that ETF twins have lower expense 
ratios of 8.6 basis points, which is a 20% decrease for the average ETF. Examining the main 
components of the overall expense ratio in columns 5 and 7, we see that mutual fund twins’ 12b-1 
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fees are higher and management fees are lower than their non-twin mutual fund peers. Conversely, 
ETF twins have statistically higher 12b-1 fees and lower management fees. 
3.1.3. Flows Results 
Next we consider if two identical asset pools in two different vehicles has an impact on the flows 
to the funds. We compute flows following Sirri and Tufano (1998) as, 




where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑓,𝑡 is the total net assets and 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the total return of fund 𝑓 in period 𝑡. We compute flow 
in two ways. First, we compute the average monthly flow in a year. Second, we compute the total 
annual flow. We winsorize both measures at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Table 4 
presents the results of the fixed effects regression with our flow measures the dependent variables. 
In Columns 1 through 3, we use the average monthly measure, and in columns 4 through 6, the total 
annual measure. Columns 2 and 5 include the covariates specified in equation (2), while columns 3 
and 6 add the annual lagged flow measure. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The mutual fund and ETF twin dummies are positive and statistically significant regardless of 
the model. These results suggest that fund families are able to generate significant inflows from 
having index twins. Of note, the average annual flows to mutual fund twins are 50% greater than 
that of their non-twin peers. For ETF twins, annual flows are 25% greater. These results suggest that 
fund families are able to drive flows to their more profitable mutual funds using the twin structure. 
These results support the findings from Massa (2003) that product differentiation, which appeals to 




3.2. Difference-in-Difference: Mutual Fund First 
To provide additional evidence of the impact of side-by-side management on the tax 
distributions to and expenses paid by investors, we exploit the historical differences between mutual 
funds and ETFs. The first index mutual fund was introduced in 1971 by Wells Fargo Bank, while the 
first ETF was launched more than twenty years later by State Street Global Advisors. The relative 
maturity of mutual funds allows us to conduct a difference-in-difference test as many mutual funds 
have an established record prior to the introduction of their ETF twin. 
In this setting, we use mutual funds that operated for at least two years prior to the introduction 
of their ETF twin as the treatment group. We denote the year that the ETF is introduced as year zero. 
The time frame for these tests is two years before and two years after a twin introduction, excluding 
the introductory year. We exclude year zero to allow for gradual adoption of the ETF by investors 
and learning by the twin mutual fund advisor. We limit observations to only two years on either 
side of treatment for two reasons. First, doing so allows us to increase our sample size. Second, 
limiting the number of periods mitigates concerns related to serial correlation bias from difference-
in-difference studies as discussed in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). We develop the 
control sample of mutual funds without a twin by matching on Morningstar category and fund size 
in the year before treatment occurs. Our matching strategy requires the control sample to be in the 
same Morningstar category, and then we use both the two and three nearest neighbors matched on 
fund size. We use two and three nearest matches to balance the trade-off between bias and variance 
associated with nearest neighbor matching. We match with replacement contingent on a control 
having multiple matches not having overlapping pre- and post-periods. Furthermore, treatment 
funds are eligible controls for the years prior to the two pre-periods. Our regressions are as follows: 
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𝑌𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑓 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑓,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡 
𝑌𝑓,𝑡 is one of the dependent variables detailed above.  𝛼𝑓 is a fund fixed effect. In this setting we are 
able to use fund fixed effects since contemporaneous twins are not included. This fixed effect allows 
us to control for a fund’s different characteristics, such as index or family, which would lead to 
different propensities to generate taxable distributions or to adjust expenses. 𝜏𝑡 is the year fixed 
effect. The interaction, 𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓,𝑡, is the covariate of interest. The coefficient on this variable, 
𝛽1, identifies the effect the ETF introduction had on the twin relative to its matched controls. 𝑋𝑓,𝑡 is 
the vector of controls that vary at the fund-year level: the log of fund size, the log of family size, and 
fund age (in years). 
3.2.1. Tax Effect Results 
In Table 5 we present the results for the difference-in-difference regressions with the tax 
variables as the outcome variables. Panel A presents the results using two nearest neighbors 
matching and Panel B uses the three nearest neighbors. The first and second columns of both panels 
show the results for the overall tax burden, the third and fourth for the long-term capital gains yield, 
and the fifth and sixth for the short-term capital gains yield.  
[Insert Table 5] 
The coefficient on the interaction term, 𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓,𝑡, is negative and significant for the 
overall tax burden regressions. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the effect of the twin 
initiation on the overall tax burden. In this figure we plot the average tax burden for the treatment 
and three nearest neighbors control groups in the four years before and after the introduction of the 




of common trends prior to treatment and documents the divergence following the introduction. 
Furthermore, it appears that managers did require time to learn how to maximize the new family 
dynamics. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 The last four columns of Table 5 demonstrate that a reduction in long-term capital gains yields 
is the source of the lower tax burden for mutual funds. In particular, the long-term capital gains 
yield for the treatment funds is 1.95% lower in the two years following the introduction of the ETF 
twin. The short-term capital gains yield is unchanged following treatment. Figure 2 presents a 
graphical representation of the long-term capital gains effect. The plot shows that mutual fund twins 
drive their long-term capital gains distributions to zero following the introduction of their ETF 
twins.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
Overall, these results confirm the findings of the fixed effects regressions; mutual funds are able to 
use the co-existence of a twin ETF to lower the long-term capital gains distributions to investors, 
thus lowering the total fund’s tax burden. 
3.2.2.  The Expense Effect 
We are able to use the difference-in-difference specification to examine whether mutual funds 
adjust their fees following the introduction of the ETF twin. Since, our specification uses two years 
after the treatment event, this allows for the typical mutual fund board, which meets annually, at 
least three opportunities to adjust fees. Table 6 shows the expense results of the difference-in-
difference specification where the dependent variables are expenses. 
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[Insert Table 6] 
In every column the coefficient on the interaction variable of interest is insignificant and nearly 
equal to zero. These findings confirm those of the fixed effects regressions that mutual fund 
investors do not receive any reduction in fees from economies of scale. Specifically, this table shows 
that mutual funds do not have significantly different expense ratios, 12b-1 fees, or management fees 
in the two years following their ETF twin introduction relative to the matched control funds.  
4. Robustness 
In this section we conduct robustness tests related to the tax effects results. We first conduct a 
falsification test of our difference-in-difference specification that rolls treatment back two years. This 
test confirms that the assumption of common trends is satisfied and that the ETF introduction drives 
the lower tax burden. Finally, we run our regressions using capital gains distribution levels rather 
than yields to confirm that returns are not driving our results. 
4.1. Difference-in-Difference Falsification Test 
We perform a falsification test to address concerns of differential pre-treatment trends driving 
the tax results. This test confirms the essential assumption of difference-in-difference identification 
of common pre-treatment trend. We estimate the same model with fund and year fixed effects as in 
Tables 5 and 6, but move the treatment period two years earlier. This test focuses on the differential 
effect of twin versus non-twin mutual funds two years prior to the introductory event. In this test, 
the pre-period is now three and four years prior to the true introduction. The post-period is now the 
year before and the year of introduction. Table 7 reports the results of this falsification test. 
[Insert Table 7] 
59 
 
We find that none of the coefficients reported are statistically significant. These results confirm 
that the two groups have common trends in the pre-period examined in the initial difference-in-
difference test. Furthermore, the results validate our intuition that the twin introduction is the main 
driver behind the identified change in taxable distributions. 
4.2. Capital Gain Distribution Levels 
The previous tests relied on yield measures, raising concerns that differences in returns to the 
index funds are contributing to the tests. In the same way that dividend yield is preferred to 
dividend levels, the conversion to yields accounts for the size of a distribution relative to the 
investment. Nevertheless, we address these concerns using the level of capital gains distributions on 
the left-hand side. As discussed in Sialm and Zhang (2015), dividend distributions are made after 
expenses are paid to the fund. This netting not only highlights the importance of standardizing by 
NAV, which is also a net value, but also makes interpretation of the total tax burden and dividend 
levels difficult. Table 8 presents the results of these tests using long-term and short-term 
distributions levels as the dependent variables. 
[Insert Table 8] 
The coefficients on the twin variables confirm the results of those in Table 2. In particular, the 
level of long-term capital gains is statistically higher for mutual fund twins than for non-twin 
mutual funds (16 basis points). For ETF twins there is no difference in the level of distributions. 
5. Conclusion 
As ETFs become an increasingly important investment alternative for institutional and retail 
investors, fund families have been forced to adapt. To retain old investors and attract new investors, 
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many mutual fund families have begun to offer mutual fund and ETF twins. Twins are comprised of 
an ETF and mutual fund in the same family that follow the same index. Essentially, these funds are 
identical pools of assets that differ only in their investment structure.  
We show that inclusion of an ETF as a twin in a mutual fund family has significant implications 
for investors and the family. In particular, mutual fund investors benefit from lower tax burdens, 
long-term capital gains distributions, and unrealized capital gains overhang. For ETF twin investors, 
the overall tax burden is unaffected, but there is some evidence that long-term capital gains 
distributions are greater. We also show that fund families do not fully pass along economies of scale 
from this arrangement, as only ETF twins have lower expense ratios. Finally, we show that twin 
funds experience greater inflows than their non-twin peers, suggesting that this form of product 
differentiation is beneficial to the family as a whole, and is a determinant for fund families to 
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Figure 1: Overall Tax Burden of a Mutual Fund around the Introduction of an ETF Twin 
Plotted below is the average of the overall tax burden computed following Bergstresser and Poterba 
(2002), Sialm (2009). MF Twins are index mutual funds whose family introduced an ETF fund that 
follows the same benchmark. The control funds are stand-along mutual funds matched on 
















Figure 2: Long-Term Capital Gains of a Mutual Fund around the Introduction of an ETF Twin 
Plotted below is the average of the long-term capital gains yield of a mutual fund, computed as the 
annual long-term capital gains distributions scaled by lagged net asset value. MF Twins are index 
mutual funds whose family introduced an ETF fund that follows the same benchmark. The control 
funds are stand-alone mutual funds matched on Morningstar category and fund size the year prior 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Number of Fund Types Per Year
Year # MF # ETF # Twins #MF Twins # ETF Twins
1997 86 1 0 0 0
1998 101 7 0 0 0
1999 138 8 0 0 0
2000 181 47 3 2 1
2001 201 66 8 5 3
2002 219 72 8 5 3
2003 215 80 10 6 4
2004 218 109 39 20 19
2005 207 145 46 24 22
2006 211 222 66 34 32
2007 227 292 77 40 37
2008 285 359 89 48 41
2009 280 386 90 48 42
2010 297 443 116 60 56
2011 319 508 141 75 66
2012 314 546 142 76 66
2013 309 523 147 81 66
2014 319 562 151 83 68
Total 4,127 4,376 1,133 607 526
Panel B: Characteristics of the Average Fund by Type
Overall MF MF Twin ETF ETF Twin
1929 2534 7873 1359 3221
199717 137128 688198 258529 734772
6.89 9.06 9.31 4.85 4.95
0.47 0.54 0.34 0.42 0.18
0.04 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.02
0.23 0.16 0.17 0.29 0.13
0.52 0.60 0.48 0.45 0.39
1.48 1.24 1.54 1.70 1.57
0.59 1.18 0.18 0.03 0.01
0.18 0.33 0.26 0.04 0.00
11.53 22.69 16.18 6.71 13.05
3.40 2.86 4.14 3.91 4.42
Annual Flows (%) 32.91 26.24 37.92 39.46 53.36








Summary statistics by investment vehicle type and by twin status for index funds for the annual sample period of
1997 to 2014. Twins are mutual funds and ETFs that operate in the same fund family and follow the same index.
Panel A presents the number of observations of mutual funds, ETFs, and twin funds by year. Twin funds are
further broken down into mutual fund and ETF twins. Panel B presents the mean of observable summary
startistics for the different categories. Fund Size is the dollar of assets in millions for all share classes of the fund.
Family Size is the total index assets under management by the fund family. Age, Expense Ratio ,12b-1 Fee , 
Management Fee ,Tax Burden , Dividend Yield , Long-Term Capital Gains (LCG) Yield , and Short-Term Capital Gains
(SCG) Yield are all the asset-weighted values for all share classes of a fund. Unrealized Gains is the total 2014






Dependent Variable: Tax Burden Tax Burden Tax Burden LCG LCG SCG SCG UNR UNR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
MF 0.131*** 0.244*** 0.174*** 1.380*** 0.991*** 0.403*** 0.460*** 14.748*** 12.150***
4.44 7.74 4.73 12.92 7.97 5.83 5.36 8.95 8.36
MF Twin -0.186*** -0.136** -1.152*** -0.821*** -0.176 -0.144 -6.365*** -6.996***
-4.29 -2.57 -9.58 -5.35 -1.46 -1.03 -3.61 -3.74
ETF Twin -0.042* -0.023 -0.001 0.189** -0.068* -0.036 5.136*** 4.286***
-1.75 -0.84 -0.01 2.16 -1.69 -0.85 4.20 3.37
Fund Size 0.011** 0.011* -0.030 -0.015 -0.452
2.01 1.92 -1.35 -1.60 -1.41
Family Size -0.020*** -0.014** -0.072*** -0.008 0.449*
-4.11 -2.44 -3.18 -0.81 1.79
Age (Years) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.052*** -0.015*** 0.766***
2.82 2.67 3.30 -2.98 3.93
Constant 1.021*** 0.859*** 0.949*** 1.577*** 2.460*** 0.197** 0.320** 7.280*** -1.017
7.11 6.59 6.35 2.59 3.48 2.03 2.50 11.97 -0.39
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
Morningstar Category FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-sqr 0.174 0.169 0.176 0.169 0.182 0.059 0.066 0.396 0.440
Obs 7,622 7,622 7,622 8,503 8,503 8,503 8,503 805 805
Table 2: Tax Fixed Effects Panel Regressions
This table presents the results of the annual fixed effects panel regression
where Tax f,s,t is one of four tax measures for fund f in Morningstar Category s in year t . The measures include total Tax Burden , long-term capital gains
yield, LCG, short-term capital gains yield, SCG, and the unrealized capital gains as a percentage of total assets, UNR . Tests with Tax Burden use data
from 1997-2013, for LCG and SCG from 1997-2014, and UNR is only available for 2014. MF is equal to one if a fund is a mutual fund. Twins are mutual
funds and ETFs in the same fund family that follow the same index. MF Twin is equal to one for the years in which a mutual fund has an ETF twin and
zero otherwise. ETF Twin is equal to one when an ETF has a mutual fund twin and zero otherwise. X i,t includes covariates that change at the style and
year level and include Fund Size f,t the log of total portfolio assets, Family Size f,t the log of total fund family assets, and the age in years of a fund. Age f,t . ηs 
is a Morningstar Category fixed effect and τt is a year fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported below the
coefficients.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑓,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐹𝑓 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑓,𝑡 + η𝑠 + τ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑠,𝑡 
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Dependent Variable: Exp. Ratio Exp. Ratio Exp. Ratio 12b1 Fees 12b1 Fees Mgmt Exp Mgmt Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MF 0.088*** 0.273*** 0.085** 0.084*** 0.055*** -0.014 -0.006
2.75 6.12 2.15 9.18 5.82 -0.38 -0.13
MF Twin -0.317*** -0.017 -0.023* 0.025* -0.084** -0.131***
-5.46 -0.31 -1.70 1.75 -2.19 -2.70
ETF Twin -0.230*** -0.086*** 0.017*** 0.038*** -0.157*** -0.192***
-10.73 -3.65 4.31 6.02 -8.11 -7.36
Fund Size -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.004* 0.026**
-6.91 -6.63 -1.95 2.09
Family Size -0.060*** -0.057*** -0.010*** 0.004
-14.88 -12.73 -5.61 0.68
Age (Years) 0.004* 0.003 0.000 0.002
1.74 1.47 0.08 0.55
Constant 1.097*** 0.298*** 1.079*** -0.039*** 0.079*** 0.174*** -0.019
20.57 7.03 17.42 -3.16 3.39 3.18 -0.15
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Morningstar Category FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-sqr 0.411 0.230 0.414 0.167 0.214 0.375 0.381
Obs 7,211 7,211 7,211 7,212 7,212 7,103 7,103
Table 3: Expense Fixed Effects Panel Regressions
This table presents the results of the annual fixed effects panel regression
where Expense f,s,t is one of three tax measures for fund f in Morningstar Category s in year t . The measures include Exp. 
Ratio, the year-end expense ratio, 12b1 Fees , the fund's 12b1 fee, and MgmtExp , a fund's year-end management expense. MF 
is equal to one if a fund is a mutual fund. Twins are mutual funds and ETFs in the same fund family that follow the same
index. MF Twin is equal to one for the years in which a mutual fund has an ETF twin and zero otherwise. ETF Twin is
equal to one when an ETF has a mutual fund twin and zero otherwise. X f,t includes covariates that change at the style and
year level and include Fund Size f,t the log of total portfolio assets, and Family Size f,t the log of total fund family assets. ηs is a
Morningstar Category fixed effect and τt is a year fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics
are reported below the coefficients.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑓,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐹𝑓 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑋𝑓,𝑡 + η𝑠 + τ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑠,𝑡 
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Dependent Variable: Avg. Monthly Avg. Monthly Avg. Monthly Annual Annual Annual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MF -1.369*** -0.212 -0.011 -18.992*** -5.519 -3.896
-4.63 -0.62 -0.05 -8.26 -1.52 -1.48
MF Twin 1.875*** 2.285*** 1.483*** 20.075*** 20.034*** 13.402***
4.15 4.98 4.44 5.54 4.40 4.33
ETF Twin 0.634** 0.844*** 0.581*** 17.058*** 14.254*** 10.748***
2.42 4.08 3.28 5.00 4.60 4.75
Fund Size 0.077 0.036 3.376*** 2.845***
1.33 0.91 5.14 5.40
Family Size -0.191*** -0.115*** -1.358*** -1.194***
-4.86 -3.84 -3.43 -3.40
Age (Years) -0.340*** -0.157*** -3.631*** -1.944***
-7.06 -5.68 -6.23 -4.99
Lagged Flows 0.279*** 0.186***
15.89 11.01
Constant 7.911*** 8.892*** 4.442*** 84.103*** 78.297*** 44.113***
12.17 11.83 8.19 10.61 8.53 5.59
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Morningstar Category FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-sqr 0.093 0.183 0.240 0.109 0.180 0.195
Obs. 8,410 8,410 7,405 7,551 7,551 6,577
Table 4: Flows Effect of Mutual Fund and ETF Twins
This table presents the results of the annual fixed effects panel regression
where Flow f,s,t is one of two flow measures for fund f in Morningstar Category s in year t . The measures includes the average
asset weighted monthly flows of all classes of fund f , Avg. Monthly ,and the value weighted total annual flows of all classes of
fund f , Annual . MF is equal to one if a fund is a mutual fund. Twins are mutual funds and ETFs in the same fund family that
follow the same index. MF Twin is equal to one for the years in which a mutual fund has an ETF twin and zero otherwise.
ETF Twin is equal to one when an ETF has a mutual fund twin and zero otherwise. X includes covariates that change at the
style and year level. Contemporaneous controls include Fund Size f,t the log of total portfolio assets, Family Size f,t the log of
total fund family assets, and Age f,t in years. Flows (Lagged) is the one year lag of the flow measure. ηs is a Morningstar
Category fixed effect and τt is a year fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported
below the coefficients.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑓,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐹𝑓 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋 + η𝑠 + τ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑠,𝑡 
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Panel A: Two Nearest Neighbors Match Panel B: Three Nearest Neighbors Match
Dependent Variable: Tax Burden Tax Burden LCG LCG SCG SCG Tax Burden Tax Burden LCG LCG SCG SCG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
MF Twin * Post -0.498*** -0.467** -2.855*** -2.823*** 0.046 0.141 -0.320* -0.299* -1.966*** -1.948*** 0.055 0.145
-2.80 -2.58 -3.81 -3.68 0.16 0.48 -1.84 -1.68 -2.68 -2.61 0.23 0.60
Post 0.274* 0.286* 1.737*** 1.823*** -0.183 -0.177 0.080 0.078 0.852 0.833 -0.224 -0.209
1.84 1.89 2.75 2.85 -0.74 -0.72 0.62 0.60 1.57 1.53 -1.26 -1.18
Fund Size -0.081 -0.710 0.014 -0.192 -1.090* -0.106
-0.44 -0.91 0.05 -1.30 -1.76 -0.52
Family Size -0.141 -0.392 -0.393 -0.054 -0.031 -0.327*
-0.95 -0.63 -1.63 -0.38 -0.05 -1.70
Age Years -0.095 -0.026 -0.267 -0.015 0.110 -0.083
-0.69 -0.04 -1.18 -0.19 0.35 -0.80
Constant 0.722** 3.053* 1.670 10.662 0.076 4.753* 0.778** 2.680* 1.888 9.516 0.178 4.089**
2.02 1.79 1.11 1.48 0.13 1.71 2.32 1.82 1.34 1.54 0.39 2.04
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-sqr 0.558 0.567 0.615 0.622 0.422 0.446 0.555 0.562 0.575 0.586 0.456 0.473
Obs. 156 156 156 156 156 156 208 208 208 208 208 208
Table 5: Mutual Fund Difference-in-Difference Around the Introduction of an ETF Twin
This table presents the results of the annual fixed effects panel regression
where Tax f,t is one of three tax measures for fund f in year t . The measures include total Tax Burden , long-term capital gains yield, LCG, and short-term capital gains yield, SCG .  
MF Twin is equal to one for a mutual fund that existed prior to the introduction of a twin ETF. Post f,t is set to one for the two years following the ETF addition for the mutual fund
twin and its controls and to zero for the two years prior. The year of the ETF launch is excluded. The controls are matched on Morningstar Category and fund size using the new
nearest neighbors in Panel A and the three nearest neighbors in Panel B. X f,t includes covariates that change at the fund and year level and include Fund Size f,t the log of total
portfolio assets, and Family Size f,t the log of total fund family assets. ϑf is a fund fixed effect and τt is a year fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics
are reported below the coefficients.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
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Panel A: Two Nearest Neighbors Match Panel B: Three Nearest Neighbors Match
Dependent Variable: Exp Ratio Exp Ratio 12b-1 Fees 12b-1 Fees Mgmt Fees Mgmt Fees Exp Ratio Exp Ratio 12b-1 Fees 12b-1 Fees Mgmt Fees Mgmt Fees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
MF Twin * Post -0.019 -0.010 -0.002 -0.003 0.010 0.010 -0.009 0.004 0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.004
-0.62 -0.33 -0.28 -0.45 0.48 0.49 -0.33 0.14 0.57 0.04 -0.03 0.14
Post 0.017 0.018 0.007 0.007 -0.011 -0.008 0.030 0.024 -0.000 0.001 0.021 0.018
0.65 0.75 1.21 1.16 -0.65 -0.47 1.43 1.17 -0.07 0.16 1.07 0.92
Fund Size -0.069** 0.004 -0.043* -0.077*** 0.010 -0.036
-1.99 0.50 -1.79 -3.26 1.59 -1.62
Family Size -0.039 0.001 -0.006 -0.026 0.005 -0.010
-1.18 0.18 -0.27 -0.85 0.65 -0.36
Age Years 0.068*** 0.004 0.034** 0.024** 0.002 0.015
3.38 0.73 2.38 2.25 0.53 1.46
Constant 0.356*** 0.833** 0.051*** -0.017 0.129*** 0.322 0.362*** 1.053*** 0.053*** -0.080 0.122*** 0.413
6.40 2.02 4.11 -0.17 3.46 1.11 7.32 3.08 4.13 -0.86 2.74 1.28
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-sqr 0.950 0.958 0.977 0.977 0.908 0.917 0.942 0.949 0.985 0.985 0.888 0.892
Obs. 132 132 132 132 132 132 176 176 176 176 176 176
Table 6: Mutual Fund Expense Difference-in-Difference Around the Introduction of an ETF Twin
This table presents the results of the annual fixed effects panel regression
where Expense f,t is one of three tax measures for fund f in year t . The measures include Exp. Ratio , the year-end expense ratio, 12b-1 Fees , the fund's 12b1 fee, and MgmtExp , a
fund's year-end management expense. MF Twin is equal to one for a mutual fund that existed prior to the introduction of a twin ETF. Post f,t is set to one for the two years following
the ETF addition for the mutual fund twin and its controls and to zero for the two years prior. The year of the ETF launch is excluded. The controls are matched on Morningstar
Category and fund size using the new nearest neighbors in Panel A and the three nearest neighbors in Panel B. X f,t includes covariates that change at the fund and year level and
include Fund Size f,t the log of total portfolio assets, and Family Size f,t the log of total fund family assets. ϑf is a fund fixed effect and τt is a year fixed effect. Standard errors are
clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
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Panel A: Two Nearest Neighbors Match Panel B: Three Nearest Neighbors Match
Dependent Variable: Tax Burden Tax Burden LCG LCG SCG SCG Tax Burden Tax Burden LCG LCG SCG SCG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
MF Twin * Post 0.395 0.353 1.565 1.615 0.026 -0.137 0.164 0.116 0.729 0.779 -0.026 -0.144
1.58 1.43 1.34 1.37 0.07 -0.33 0.77 0.53 0.86 0.89 -0.08 -0.45
Post -0.693*** -0.497** -2.440** -2.698** -0.478 -0.340 -0.364** -0.269* -1.293** -1.231** -0.312 -0.224
-3.49 -2.10 -2.64 -2.38 -1.49 -0.87 -2.58 -1.77 -2.31 -2.02 -1.53 -1.00
Fund Size -0.541 0.637 -0.426 -0.287 0.020 -0.354
-1.48 0.36 -0.71 -1.51 0.03 -1.27
Family Size 0.534 -3.180 1.692 0.145 -1.494 0.661
0.84 -1.04 1.60 0.35 -0.89 1.08
Age (Years) 0.393** 1.756* 0.263 0.355* 1.374* 0.332
2.11 1.97 0.85 1.97 1.90 1.26
Constant 1.201*** -2.337 2.207 16.251 0.958 -13.389* 0.896*** 0.045 1.823 8.819 0.658 -4.069
3.19 -0.49 1.26 0.71 1.58 -1.69 2.88 0.02 1.48 0.74 1.46 -0.94
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-sqr 0.715 0.751 0.593 0.624 0.604 0.636 0.592 0.619 0.556 0.576 0.506 0.525
Obs. 84 84 84 84 84 84 136 136 136 136 136 136
where Tax f,t is one of three tax measures for fund f in year t . The measures include total Tax Burden , long-term capital gains yield, LCG, and short-term capital gains yield, SCG .  
MF Twin is equal to one for a mutual fund that existed prior to the introduction of a twin ETF. Post f,t is set to one for the two years following treatment. Treatment occurs two years
prior to the ETF addition for the mutual fund twin and its controls and to zero for the two years prior. The year of the hypothetical treatment is excluded. The controls are matched
on Morningstar Category and fund size using the new nearest neighbors in Panel A and the three nearest neighbors in Panel B. X f,t includes covariates that change at the fund and
year level and include Fund Size f,t the log of total portfolio assets, and Family Size f,t the log of total fund family assets. ϑf is a fund fixed effect and τt is a year fixed effect. Standard
errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
Table 7: Robustness - Mutual Fund Difference-in-Difference with Treatment Two Years After the Introduction of an ETF Twin
This table presents the results of the annual fixed effects panel regression
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Dependent Variable: LCG Level LCG Level SCG Level SCG Level
MF 0.259*** 0.163*** 0.057*** 0.059***
11.73 5.88 3.99 3.69
MF Twin -0.207*** -0.160*** -0.002 0.005
-6.92 -3.80 -0.08 0.14
ETF Twin -0.013 0.019 -0.031** -0.021
-1.04 1.18 -2.56 -1.56
Fund Size -0.015** -0.008***
-2.33 -3.16
Family Size -0.005 -0.000
-1.25 -0.06
Age (Years) 0.019*** -0.000
3.98 -0.31
Constant 0.289** 0.437*** 0.064*** 0.104***
2.46 3.51 3.23 3.69
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Morningstar Category FE Y Y Y Y
R-sqr 0.116 0.136 0.054 0.058
Obs. 8,503 8,503 8,503 8,503
Table 8: Robustness - Tax Distribution Levels
This table presents the results of the annual fixed effects panel regression
where Tax Level f,s,t is either the total annual level of long-term or short-term capital gains by
fund f in Morningstar Category s in year t . MF is equal to one if a fund is a mutual fund.
Twins are mutual funds and ETFs in the same fund family that follow the same index. MF 
Twin is equal to one for the years in which a mutual fund has an ETF twin and zero
otherwise. ETF Twin is equal to one when an ETF has a mutual fund twin and zero
otherwise. X f,t includes covariates that change at the style and year level and include
Fund Size f,t , the log of total portfolio assets, and Family Size f,t , the log of total fund family
assets. ηs is a Morningstar Category fixed effect and τt is a year fixed effect. Standard errors
are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported below the coefficients. * indicates
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑓,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐹𝑓 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑓,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑠,𝑡 
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Abstract
Latent factors have been used successfully to characterize hedge fund returns be-
yond the observable asset based factors. Using principal component analysis, Fung
and Hsieh (1997a) extract five latent components of hedge fund returns that explain
up to 43% of the common return variation of hedge funds. Employing the alternative
estimator of Connor and Korajczyk (1986, 1987), I show that asymptotic principal
components (APC) can explain 42% more of the common variation of hedge fund re-
turns on average and over a larger sample period. Further, the hedge fund factor model
of Fung and Hsieh (2004, 2006) achieve larger R¯2s when employing APC extracted fac-
tors as regressors than those obtained from the traditional approach. I also identify
an increase in the common variation across hedge fund excess return in the time-series
via the extracted latent factors. This increase corresponds with a rise in flows to hedge
fund strategies and an attendant crowding e↵ect noted in the literature. My results
suggest an impetus for future researchers to employ APC factors when characterizing
hedge fund performance.




The attractiveness of using asset class factor models is the ability to attribute performance of
an investment vehicle (e.g., a mutual or hedge fund) to major asset classes.1 From this, one
can discern an investment “style” of a particular fund manager, as shown in Sharpe (1992),
by regressing fund excess return on many styles or asset classes (styles). In fact, extracting
from the arbitrage pricing theory model (APT) of Ross (1976), even style can be employed
as factors.2 Harlow and Brown (2006) show that some mutual funds exhibit performance
persistence when adjusted for these style exposures, particularly when augmented by asset
class factors in the form of sector exposures.3
The literature has followed the rise of hedge funds in a similar fashion. In their pioneer-
ing paper, Fung and Hsieh (1997a) show that mutual fund styles explain very little of hedge
fund performance on average, which they attribute to the dynamic investment behavior of
hedge funds. Accordingly, the authors augment the Sharpe (1992) style model by identifying
dynamic factors. Using principal components analysis (PCA), they extract five mutually or-
thogonal principal components explaining 43% of the cross sectional return variance. Only
three of these components qualify as dynamic strategies, which the authors identify in their
2001 paper and link to observable prices.4 Combining factors from equity and fixed income
mutual funds, as well as their dynamic strategy factors, Fung and Hsieh (2004) construct a
seven-factor asset based model that explains up to 80% of return variation across funds of
hedge funds (FoFs).5
Using hedge fund factor exposures as identified in Fung and Hsieh (2004), Fung, Hsieh,
Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) analyzed FoFs over the period of 1995-2000 and found a subset
of funds that delivered alpha over longer periods. Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov
(2010) extend the model with a correction for autocorrelation6 and find that only superior
1as noted by Jones (2001)
2see Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997)
3see Pstor and Stambaugh (2002)
4Fung and Hsieh (2001) develop factors for three common trend-following strategies
5see Jones and Wermers (2011) for a summary of the mutual fund and hedge fund literatures
6according to Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)
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funds generated persistent returns over the period of 1996-2005. Correcting for non-normality
of hedge fund returns, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) find that top-decile hedge funds
outperform bottom-decile funds by 5.8% in the ensuing year.7
The technique of principal components analysis, which Fung and Hsieh (1997a) employ
to identify dynamic strategies, has limitations. In particular, employing principal compo-
nents analysis to extract latent factors relies on a balanced panel such that over longer
horizons, only those hedge funds with commensurate operating lives are analyzed, or con-
versely, a restriction on the time horizon is necessary. Accordingly, I employ the asymptotic
principal components (APC) model of Connor and Korajczyk (1986), which when augmented
by their missing observation technique,8 allows for the inclusion of all return observations in
the analysis (full N , full T ), thus increasing the explanatory power of each factor (Connor
and Korajczyk (1986, 1987) henceforth CK). While Fung and Hsieh (1997a) find the top five
principal components explain 43% of the variation of funds, the replication of these results
eludes researchers given the data source nor the time period employed in the paper are dis-
closed. Using traditional PCA on my available dataset, I replicate the technique of Fung
and Hsieh (1997a; henceforth FH) and show that the top five principal components explain
up to 40% of the common variation between hedge funds using average R¯2 for individual
funds, or 87.5% with an equal-weighted portfolio. Comparatively, I show that employing
APC significantly improves adjusted r-sqaures (R¯2) over the replicated results of Fung and
Hsieh, achieving a fit of 50% and 99%, respectively, when components are extracted accord-
ing to APC theory. Further, applying components extracted using FH to out of sample
returns results in a decrease in average R¯2 of as little as 18% for individual funds, or 55%
for equal-weighted portfolios.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section describes the data
employed in the sample, followed in section 2 by a discussion of the theoretical methodology.
Section 3 provides results of the empirical findings of the paper, and I conclude the paper in
section 4.
7their method is a hedge fund extension of Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006)
8see Connor and Korajczyk (1987)
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1 Data
The data comes from Lipper-TASS for the period 1994:01-2012:12 on all hedge fund strategies
as identified in the dataset. The strategies include Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Short
Bias, Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven, Fixed Income Arbitrage,
Fund of Funds, Global Macro, Long/Short Equity Hedge, Managed Futures, Multi-Strategy,
and Options Strategy.
While TASS data extends before 1994, the capturing of data from delisted hedge funds
(“dead” funds) began in 1994. Thus, the inclusion of dead funds reduces much of the
survivorship bias that may be present in the “live” funds database.9 Recently, Edelman, Fung
and Hsieh (2013) find that the various motivations for delisting from commercial databases
have o↵set one another over the recent decade; however, the inclusion of dead funds data
is commensurate with the bulk of the literature. The dataset consists of just over 18,400
unique hedge fund vehicles that have at least 24 monthly observations who report net-of-fee
returns (see Table 1). The largest category of hedge fund in the sample are FoFs, with about
6,200 funds, followed by long/short equity hedge (3,885) and multi-strategy funds (2,321).
Incubation bias in hedge fund returns arises when firms “incubate” funds for several
years and decided to report returns to commercial databases such as TASS if the early return
stream is “good enough.” Fung and Hsieh (2002a) show that incubation bias in the TASS
dataset is resolved at the 12 month mark.10 Thus, I remove the first 12 months of each fund’s
return history. Lastly, I remove replicated funds from the data set that are pursuing the
same strategies within a particular management company, and thus, have almost identical
returns. These “replicated” funds are developed by hedge fund management companies to
cater to specific needs of the investor interested in the same strategy (e.g., o↵shore vehicles
for tax exempt entities, or non-US dollar based funds) in e↵ort to garnering flows, and would
9see Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (1997); Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999); and Malkiel
and Saha (2005)
10Park (1995) showed incubation period of 27 months for MAR CTA database (now Morningstar CISDM);
Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (1997) similarly showed incubation periods of 27 months for CTAs and 15
months for hedge funds in the TASS data set
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lead to erroneous conclusions about cross-sectional correlations if left in the data set. After
removing funds that fit these criteria, we are left with just over 2,500 unique hedge funds
(bottom of table 1).
I also divide the sample between fund of funds (FoFs) and all remaining strategies
in the sample except for FoFs (henceforth, NoFoFs); a delineation shown in the literature.
Fung and Hsieh (1997a) perform PCA analysis on all funds except FoFs (NoFoFs here) and
emerging market funds. In a later paper, Fung and Hsieh (2000a, 2002a) highlight the a↵ects
of the various biases found in the commercially available hedge fund databases and show that
employing FoFs closely mimics returns to actual hedge fund portfolios, which are free from
said biases. Thus, I include both for the purpose of this analysis.
2 Methodology
As noted in Jones (2001), using principal components analysis (PCA, as in FH) is particularly
attractive when analyzing portfolio returns as it requires no specification of the factors ex
ante. Thus, it is an ideal method to test asset pricing models. Following the literature, we
assume hedge fund returns follow a factor structure as in an APT model,
Rn = BnF + en, (1)
where, Rn is an n⇥1 vector of excess returns at time t, Bn is an n⇥k matrix of factor loadings
(sensitivities), F is a k ⇥ T vector of systemic factors, and en is an n ⇥ T matrix of asset
specific residuals. From this factor structure, PCA extracts the k-largest eigenvalues and
corresponding eigenvectors from the covariance matrix of returns, ⌃. Here, the covariance
matrix will be n⇥n, requiring extraordinary computing resources for the decomposition as n
gets large. Further, the PCA method relies on a balanced panel for the extraction, reducing
the number of observations in panels with missing data.
Based on the work of Chamberlin and Rothschild (1983), Connor and Korajczyk (1986)
define Asymptotic Principal Components as the eigenvectors obtained from the k-largest







This T ⇥ T matrix reduces the computational burden of factor reduction, while achieving
consistent estimates of the latent factors. Thus, we are able to estimate latent factors
from large cross-sections whereas under traditional PCA this would be impossible. The
convenience of the CK approach is that it does not rely upon a normal distribution of returns
nor a diagonal covariance matrix, and allows for time-varying factor risk premia. Note that
the full decomposition of the cross-product matrix, ⌦n, which includes unobservable and



















However, under the assumption of independence between factors and residuals (CK assump-
tion 7), the Bn and Zn terms are equal to zero, leaving the observable T ⇥ T matrix, ⌦n.
The CK method by itself, however, does not avoid the loss of firm observations resulting
from missing data in the panel. To accommodate for missing data, CK propose an alternative
estimator for ⌦n. In their specification, Connor and Korajczyk (1987) define Rm be them⇥T
matrix of excess returns where missing data are replaced with zeroes. Let Im be an indicator
matrix for which Im is equal to one if Rm is observed, and zero otherwise. If returns in Rm
follow the process in equation (1), then the estimates of the latent factors extracted from
the alternative estimator,
⌦m = (Rm0Rm)/(Im0Im), (4)
are identical to those from equation (2); i.e., ⌦n = ⌦m. Hence, we are able to extract as much
information contained in the returns data, thereby enhancing e ciency of our estimator.
3 Empirical Tests and Findings
3.1 Latent Factor Regressions
Applying the PCA technique over the whole sample period necessarily drops funds with
missing return data in order to form a balanced panel. Therefore, I create sub-periods
according to Fung and Hsieh (2004) at least through the end of 2002, when the paper’s
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sample period end. Beyond 2002, I exploit shocks in the liquidity factor of Sadka (2006)11 to
identify additional regimes for analysis.12 By reducing the horizon for the analysis, I hope
to extract the maximal common variance across hedge fund returns using the FH method
by reducing the number of excluded funds resulting from the balanced panel requirement.
Using the eigenvectors extracted from the covariance matrix of excess returns as our
vector of factors (via PCA), for both in- and out-of-sample funds, I regress excess returns
of individual funds and an equal-weighted portfolio on the factors as outlined in equation
(1). Specifically, I regress excess returns comprised of the funds from which the factors were
extracted onto the latent factors (in sample), Rnin = B
nF + en. Then the same regression
is run using funds that have some returns in the dataset for the given time period and
strategy, but were dropped from the PCA technique due to the balanced panel restriction
(out-of-sample), Rnout = B
nF + en.
Results from these regressions can be found in the left hand pane of Tables 2 and 3 for
FoFs and all other funds (NoFoFs), respectively. Notice that on average, the ability for the
extracted factors to explain out-of-sample excess returns is less than for in-sample returns
(Panels A and B, respectively). For FoFs, the first five principal components explain 42%
(43.2%) of the common variation among funds, whilst the out-of-sample adjusted-R2 falls
to 26.9% (29.6%) for individual (equal-weighted) regressions over the entire sample period
(1994:01-2012:12). For NoFoFs, R¯2s predictably decline to 36.6% (63.1%) and 20.3% (58.8%)
for in- and out-out-sample regressions, respectively.
By construction, FoFs exhibit lower volatility than individual funds, thus we should
expect less common variation from the NoFoF funds. The tables also include the number of
funds included in the PCA factor extraction and subsequent regressions by time period. On
average we are leaving a large percentage of funds out of the decomposition using traditional
PCA, thereby reducing e ciency of our estimators. For example, over the entire sample
period of 1994-2012, PCA extracts components from only nine funds from a sample of 518
FoFs, and 36 of the remaining 2,061 hedge funds. Thus, when regressing excess returns from
11Thanks to Ronnie Sadka for making the liquidity factors from Sadka (2006) available at his website:
https://www2.bc.edu/˜sadka/
12These regimes are supported by Edelman, Fung, Hsieh, and Naik (2012) through the end of 2010
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the remaining 509 out-of-sample FoFs onto the components extracted from these nine funds,
R¯2s fall to 26.9%; the components have less common variance from which to explain excess
returns.
To further this point, the in- and out-of-sample R¯2s for FoFs during the 2007:07-2009:04
period of 50.2% and 49.7% for the first five components, respectively, shows evidence of
minimal decay in explanatory power for out-of-sample regressions when the in-sample size
is large relative to the out-of-sample size (N=241 versus N=116).
Following the same approach, I run the regressions of equation (1) of excess return on
the factors extracted with the CK alternative asymptotic estimator. This ensures we extract
as much common variance across the excess returns of hedge funds in the sample as possible,
the results of which are displayed in the right hand panes of Tables 2 and 3. Highlighting
the e ciency of the APC technique, these regressions bear R¯2s from the first five principal
components of 61.3% (94.2%) for individual (equal-weighted) FoFs over the entire sample
period, and 35.2% (90.2%) for NoFoFs. For FoFs, a gain of almost 30% is achieved (61.3%
from 42% in-sample) for individual fund regressions and a doubling is achieved for equal-
weighted portfolios (94.2% from 43.2% in-sample) when employing the CK methodology.
NoFoF APCs (principal components from all other funds other than FoFs) modestly lose
power at the individual fund level (35.2% from 36.6% in-sample), but gain ground on equal-
weighted regressions (90.2% from 63.1% in-sample) from the first five latent components.
Given the CK approach is inclusive of all funds, a more appropriate comparison would
have CK results next to the PCA out-of-sample results. Here, we see even more dramatic
improvements in explanatory power between the two techniques, with a roughly 15-point
gain between NoFoF R¯2s using the first five components as evidence over the entire sample
period.
Relative to PCA, the e ciency of the CK technique is also on display here. Over the full
sample period, the CK method gains little from the inclusion of principal components beyond
5 (7.5% for FoFs), while the FH method has a larger percentage gain from the inclusion of
more components into the regression (33% for FoFs). Thus, the CK method achieves a
greater explanation of the common variation among hedge funds with fewer latent factors.
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The results also provide some time series implications. By analyzing the various horizon
regimes, we see a notable increase in R¯2s from the first period (1994:01-1998:09) to the most
recent periods on average across fund types (FoF or NoFoFs) and across factor extraction
methods (FH or CK). For example, the R¯2s increase from 18% to 41.8% for the first five
principal components of FH out-of-sample regressions among FoFs between the first and last
period, and similarly, the CK method for the sample period and funds improves from 57%
to 67.5%. These results coincide with a rise in the number of hedge funds and asset flows
into these strategies and suggests that the proliferation of hedge fund vehicles has resulted
in a crowding e↵ect with attendant increases in fund return correlations.13
3.2 Identifying Latent Factors
Clearly, the method of CK is superior to that of PCA in explaining common variation across
hedge fund returns. However, the abstract nature of these components begs for identification.
Fung and Hsieh satisfy this need for linkages to observable prices by identifying market factors
and trading strategies that closely price, and thus convert, returns based factors into asset
based factors. With the inclusion of an emerging market factor in Fung and Hsieh (2006),
the Fung and Hsieh model culminates in eight factors, which is comprised of two equity
factors similar to the first two factors of Fama and French (1993), the S&P 500 minus the
risk free rate (SP-Rf) and the S&P 500 minus the Russell 2000 index (SP-RL); two fixed
income factors consisting of the excess return to ten-year treasuries (TY-Rf) and the return
of Moody’s BAA corporate bonds over ten-year treasuries (BAA-TY); three trend following
factors consisting of excess returns on bonds (PTFSBD-Rf), foreign currencies (PTFSFX-
Rf), and commodities (PTFSCOM-Rf);14 and lastly, a factor for emerging markets, taken
from the International Finance Corporation index (IFC-Rf).15
Before identifying latent factors, I begin with those that can be witnessed; the reported
returns. Table 4 shows R¯2s from regressions of fund excess returns, Ri, on the observable
13Fung and Hsieh (2007) and Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) find increasing correlations between hedge
funds and standard market indices.
14as added in Fung and Hsieh (2001)
15Thanks to David Hsieh for providing these factors on his website: http://people.duke.edu/˜dah7/
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hedge fund factors of Fung and Hsieh, as follows:
Ri = ↵i +  1,i(SP  Rf) +  2,i(SP  RL) +  3,i(TY  Rf) (5)
+  4,i(BAA  TY ) +  5,i(PTFSBD  Rf) +  6,i(PTFSFX  Rf)
+  7,i(PTFSCOM  Rf) +  8,i(IFC  Rf) + ei.
The top line of each panel shows the R¯2 from a multivariate regression across all 8-
factors, and below, univariate R2s for each factor individually. Relative to Fung and Hsieh,
I achieve an equal-weighted R¯2 of 68.8% during the same horizon in their 2004 paper of
2000:04-2002:12 when projecting FoF excess returns onto the 8-factor model (left side of
Panel B),16 reaching a maximum of 83.1% during the most recent period (2009:05-2012:12),
and an overall fit of 64% for the entire period.17 For individual funds, I obtain a maximum R¯2
during the most recent period of 58.9% and an overall fit of 46.9% for the whole period. On
the right hand side of the table, I show results for regressing NoFoF returns onto the factors.
Notably, while the individual fund results fall almost predictably across the board relative to
FoFs, the equal-weighted NoFoF (EW-NoFoF) results achieve higher R¯2s on average. This
may suggest that FoFs provide some diversification benefit beyond a naive 1/N investment
policy.18 Dissecting this further, we see that over the full sample period, NoFoFs load more
heavily on the equity factors (SP-Rf and SP-RL), including the emerging market equity
strategies (IFC-Rf), while loadings on the fixed income factors decline (TY-Rf and BAA-
TY). This holds for both equal-weighted and individual fund regressions, suggesting our
FoFs sample have a more balanced exposure towards fixed income risk factors and away
from equity factors.
Identification of the principal components (PCs) takes the same approach. Tables 5
and 6 show R2s and associated t-stats from regressing PCs (latent factors) onto the 8-factors
of Fung and Hsieh. Specifically, each PC is projected onto each factor one by one as follows:
16Fung and Hsieh (2004) only used the first 7-factors
17Fung and Hsieh (2004) obtain an R2 of 80% over the period 2000:04-2002:12 using the returns of the
Hedge Fund Research FoF index (HFRFOF) on 7-factors
18see DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007)
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PCi = ↵i +  1,i(SP  Rf) + ei (6)
PCi = ↵i +  2,i(SP  RL) + ei
...
PCi = ↵i +  8,i(IFC  Rf) + ei.
Then, the same PC is regressed across all factors (multivariate) to achieve the reported
R¯2 in the last column of each panel according to:
PCi = ↵i +  1,i(SP  Rf) +  2,i(SP  RL) +  3,i(TY  Rf) (7)
+  4,i(BAA  TY ) +  5,i(PTFSBD  Rf) +  6,i(PTFSFX  Rf)
+  7,i(PTFSCOM  Rf) +  8,i(IFC  Rf) + ei.
The left side of the table shows results from the components obtained from the FH
method, and the right side shows those from the CK method. It is quickly evident that the
8-factors explain a great deal more of the variation in extracted components from the CK
method relative to those of the FH method. For example, over the entire sample period, the
R¯2 for the first principal component (PC1) from the CK method reaches 76.4% while PC1
from the FH method only obtains 26.8%. That is, the 8-factors of FH explain three times
more of the first principal component extracted via the CK method than they do for the
first component of FH. This result bolsters the case for the ability of the 8-factor model to
explain hedge fund returns. Further, the t-stats indicate the direction of exposure to each
observed factor. For PC1, we see the component has positive and significant loadings on SP-
Rf, TY-Rf, and IFC-Rf, while loading negatively and significantly on the remaining factors.
This suggests that PC1 - from both extraction methods - could be viewed as a portfolio with
long exposure to the US equity market, US treasuries, and emerging markets, combined with
short exposure to all remaining factors in the model. We see the same outcome on R2s for
the NoFoFs, with an even greater improvement between the two methods.
The orthogonality of the principal components, however, limits our ability to strictly
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identify the components with observable factors. Particularly, as the components as ex-
tracted are only mutually orthogonal to one another and not to the observable factors. The
8-factors of FH themselves are not orthogonal to each other, thus complicating the identifica-
tion exercise. Yet, we can be sure the 8-factor model says much more about the components
extracted via the CK method on average, than the traditional PCA of FH.
4 Conclusion
Fung and Hsieh (1997a) set forth a novel approach to link return based factors to asset
based factors for hedge funds. Using traditional principal component extraction to explain
hedge fund returns has proven beneficial in understanding the return dynamics of hedge
fund strategies. Employing an alternative estimator proposed by Connor and Korajczyk
(1986, 1987) from which to extract latent factors, I have shown leads to e ciency gains
and greater power when explaining the common variation across hedge fund excess returns.
Further, the latent factors extracted from the asymptotic estimator exhibit a better fit
with the observable hedge fund factors of Fung and Hsieh. Lastly, the latent factors have
corroborated the evidence of increased correlations among observed excess returns in the time
series, suggesting a crowding e↵ect among respective hedge fund strategies and the resultant
decline in returns witnessed in the literature. There remains, however, some explanatory
power of the principal components over the observable factor model, thereby forcing us to
consider their use to augment models restricted solely to observable factors. Accordingly,
future research of comparative hedge fund return characteristics should consider latent factor









All Funds 18412 0.27 3.40 3.27 11.77 0.28
Convertible Arbitrage 308 0.28 2.42 3.45 8.40 0.41
Dedicated Short Bias 56 ‐0.07 6.07 ‐0.88 21.02 ‐0.04
Emerging Markets 1033 0.33 5.47 3.98 18.96 0.21
Equity Market Neutral 693 0.34 3.72 4.10 12.90 0.32
Event Driven 802 0.52 3.06 6.43 10.60 0.61
Fixed Income Arbitrage 473 0.36 2.28 4.44 7.91 0.56
Fund of Funds 6261 ‐0.03 2.48 ‐0.30 8.58 ‐0.04
Global Macro 921 0.40 3.52 4.89 12.20 0.40
Long/Short Equity Hedge 3885 0.45 4.62 5.48 15.99 0.34
Managed Futures 1112 0.21 5.04 2.53 17.45 0.15
Multi‐Strategy 2321 0.52 2.50 6.44 8.65 0.74
Options Strategy 51 0.83 4.09 10.49 14.16 0.74
Other 495 0.56 2.85 6.88 9.88 0.70
Cleaned Sample**
All Funds 2579 0.51 4.08 6.23 14.14 0.44
Convertible Arbitrage 67 0.28 2.47 3.37 8.56 0.39
Dedicated Short Bias 20 ‐0.09 6.55 ‐1.02 22.68 ‐0.04
Emerging Markets 83 0.64 5.50 7.93 19.05 0.42
Equity Market Neutral 136 0.35 2.78 4.34 9.63 0.45
Event Driven 242 0.68 3.34 8.51 11.56 0.74
Fixed Income Arbitrage 69 0.50 2.28 6.10 7.90 0.77
Fund of Funds 518 0.26 2.57 3.20 8.89 0.36
Global Macro 81 0.52 4.63 6.45 16.03 0.40
Long/Short Equity Hedge 900 0.61 5.10 7.53 17.67 0.43
Managed Futures 232 0.43 5.94 5.30 20.58 0.26
Multi‐Strategy 133 0.56 3.05 6.90 10.55 0.65
Options Strategy 7 0.53 3.51 6.61 12.17 0.54
Other 91 0.91 3.60 11.44 12.46 0.92
* Base dataset has been screened for funds with at least 24 months of reported return on a net ‐of‐fee basis
Month Annual
** The cleaned dataset restricts replicative share classes that are typically domiciled off‐shore from their 
respective management company and non‐US dollar based
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